中小股东保护与高管薪酬合同效力:来自中国证券投资者服务中心设立的证据

IF 4.2 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Xiang Zhang , Chongjie Xu , Hongzhan Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究从高管薪酬粘性的角度考察中小股东的治理效果。以中国证券投资者服务中心(ISC)股东权利执行为准自然实验,以2013 - 2022年中国a股上市公司为样本,研究发现,ISC股东权利执行显著降低了高管薪酬粘性。这是通过增加外部关注来实现的,这可以减轻信息不对称,并通过遏制控股股东的隧道行为来实现的。进一步分析表明,对于外部审计师监督程度较低、法律环境欠发达、机构所有权较低、管理权力较高的公司,执行ISC的影响更为明显。这些发现强调了ISC在加强公司治理和保护中小股东利益方面的作用,为加强投资者权利和监管机制提供了政策启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Minority shareholders protection and executive compensation contract effectiveness: Evidence from the establishment of the China Securities Investor Service Center
This study examines the governance effect of minority shareholders from the perspective of executive compensation stickiness. Taking the China Securities Investor Service Center's (ISC) execution of shareholder rights as a quasi-natural experiment, with a sample from China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022, our findings reveal that ISC shareholder rights enforcement significantly reduces executive compensation stickiness. This is achieved through increased external attention, which mitigates information asymmetry, and by curbing tunneling behavior from controlling shareholders. Further analysis highlights that the impact of ISC enforcement is more pronounced for firms with lower external auditor monitoring, less developed legal environment, lower institutional ownership, and higher managerial power. These findings underscore the ISC's role in enhancing corporate governance and protecting minority shareholder benefits, offering policy implications for strengthening investor rights and regulatory oversight mechanisms.
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来源期刊
Economic Modelling
Economic Modelling ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
10.60%
发文量
295
期刊介绍: Economic Modelling fills a major gap in the economics literature, providing a single source of both theoretical and applied papers on economic modelling. The journal prime objective is to provide an international review of the state-of-the-art in economic modelling. Economic Modelling publishes the complete versions of many large-scale models of industrially advanced economies which have been developed for policy analysis. Examples are the Bank of England Model and the US Federal Reserve Board Model which had hitherto been unpublished. As individual models are revised and updated, the journal publishes subsequent papers dealing with these revisions, so keeping its readers as up to date as possible.
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