{"title":"中小股东保护与高管薪酬合同效力:来自中国证券投资者服务中心设立的证据","authors":"Xiang Zhang , Chongjie Xu , Hongzhan Li","doi":"10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107213","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the governance effect of minority shareholders from the perspective of executive compensation stickiness. Taking the China Securities Investor Service Center's (ISC) execution of shareholder rights as a quasi-natural experiment, with a sample from China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022, our findings reveal that ISC shareholder rights enforcement significantly reduces executive compensation stickiness. This is achieved through increased external attention, which mitigates information asymmetry, and by curbing tunneling behavior from controlling shareholders. Further analysis highlights that the impact of ISC enforcement is more pronounced for firms with lower external auditor monitoring, less developed legal environment, lower institutional ownership, and higher managerial power. These findings underscore the ISC's role in enhancing corporate governance and protecting minority shareholder benefits, offering policy implications for strengthening investor rights and regulatory oversight mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48419,"journal":{"name":"Economic Modelling","volume":"151 ","pages":"Article 107213"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Minority shareholders protection and executive compensation contract effectiveness: Evidence from the establishment of the China Securities Investor Service Center\",\"authors\":\"Xiang Zhang , Chongjie Xu , Hongzhan Li\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107213\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>This study examines the governance effect of minority shareholders from the perspective of executive compensation stickiness. Taking the China Securities Investor Service Center's (ISC) execution of shareholder rights as a quasi-natural experiment, with a sample from China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022, our findings reveal that ISC shareholder rights enforcement significantly reduces executive compensation stickiness. This is achieved through increased external attention, which mitigates information asymmetry, and by curbing tunneling behavior from controlling shareholders. Further analysis highlights that the impact of ISC enforcement is more pronounced for firms with lower external auditor monitoring, less developed legal environment, lower institutional ownership, and higher managerial power. These findings underscore the ISC's role in enhancing corporate governance and protecting minority shareholder benefits, offering policy implications for strengthening investor rights and regulatory oversight mechanisms.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48419,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Modelling\",\"volume\":\"151 \",\"pages\":\"Article 107213\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-06-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Modelling\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999325002081\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Modelling","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999325002081","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Minority shareholders protection and executive compensation contract effectiveness: Evidence from the establishment of the China Securities Investor Service Center
This study examines the governance effect of minority shareholders from the perspective of executive compensation stickiness. Taking the China Securities Investor Service Center's (ISC) execution of shareholder rights as a quasi-natural experiment, with a sample from China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022, our findings reveal that ISC shareholder rights enforcement significantly reduces executive compensation stickiness. This is achieved through increased external attention, which mitigates information asymmetry, and by curbing tunneling behavior from controlling shareholders. Further analysis highlights that the impact of ISC enforcement is more pronounced for firms with lower external auditor monitoring, less developed legal environment, lower institutional ownership, and higher managerial power. These findings underscore the ISC's role in enhancing corporate governance and protecting minority shareholder benefits, offering policy implications for strengthening investor rights and regulatory oversight mechanisms.
期刊介绍:
Economic Modelling fills a major gap in the economics literature, providing a single source of both theoretical and applied papers on economic modelling. The journal prime objective is to provide an international review of the state-of-the-art in economic modelling. Economic Modelling publishes the complete versions of many large-scale models of industrially advanced economies which have been developed for policy analysis. Examples are the Bank of England Model and the US Federal Reserve Board Model which had hitherto been unpublished. As individual models are revised and updated, the journal publishes subsequent papers dealing with these revisions, so keeping its readers as up to date as possible.