{"title":"锻造货币鹰派:非洲早期通胀经验和政府债务","authors":"Christine Strong","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12450","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study uses a novel dataset to examine the impact of early-life inflation experiences on government debt across 30 African nations from 1980 to 2022. We propose that central bankers who encountered inflation crises during their formative years are more likely to develop preferences for hawkish monetary policies. However, for these preferences to influence fiscal outcomes, central bankers must operate within an environment of institutional independence. Indeed, our analysis reveals that past exposures to inflation crises, on their own, have no statistically significant impact on government debt. However, when central bank independence is accounted for, a significant negative relationship emerges, indicating that institutional autonomy enables central bankers to translate their early-life experiences into policies that curb debt accumulation. This relationship holds even after controlling for central bankers' expertise, highlighting the critical interplay between personal history and institutional design in shaping government debt dynamics.</p>","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":"78 3","pages":"1021-1036"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/kykl.12450","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Forging Monetary Hawks: Early-Life Inflation Experiences and Government Debt in Africa\",\"authors\":\"Christine Strong\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/kykl.12450\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This study uses a novel dataset to examine the impact of early-life inflation experiences on government debt across 30 African nations from 1980 to 2022. We propose that central bankers who encountered inflation crises during their formative years are more likely to develop preferences for hawkish monetary policies. However, for these preferences to influence fiscal outcomes, central bankers must operate within an environment of institutional independence. Indeed, our analysis reveals that past exposures to inflation crises, on their own, have no statistically significant impact on government debt. However, when central bank independence is accounted for, a significant negative relationship emerges, indicating that institutional autonomy enables central bankers to translate their early-life experiences into policies that curb debt accumulation. This relationship holds even after controlling for central bankers' expertise, highlighting the critical interplay between personal history and institutional design in shaping government debt dynamics.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47739,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kyklos\",\"volume\":\"78 3\",\"pages\":\"1021-1036\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/kykl.12450\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kyklos\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/kykl.12450\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kyklos","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/kykl.12450","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Forging Monetary Hawks: Early-Life Inflation Experiences and Government Debt in Africa
This study uses a novel dataset to examine the impact of early-life inflation experiences on government debt across 30 African nations from 1980 to 2022. We propose that central bankers who encountered inflation crises during their formative years are more likely to develop preferences for hawkish monetary policies. However, for these preferences to influence fiscal outcomes, central bankers must operate within an environment of institutional independence. Indeed, our analysis reveals that past exposures to inflation crises, on their own, have no statistically significant impact on government debt. However, when central bank independence is accounted for, a significant negative relationship emerges, indicating that institutional autonomy enables central bankers to translate their early-life experiences into policies that curb debt accumulation. This relationship holds even after controlling for central bankers' expertise, highlighting the critical interplay between personal history and institutional design in shaping government debt dynamics.
期刊介绍:
KYKLOS views economics as a social science and as such favours contributions dealing with issues relevant to contemporary society, as well as economic policy applications. Since its inception nearly 60 years ago, KYKLOS has earned a worldwide reputation for publishing a broad range of articles from international scholars on real world issues. KYKLOS encourages unorthodox, original approaches to topical economic and social issues with a multinational application, and promises to give fresh insights into topics of worldwide interest