高管股权激励能否增强企业偿债能力?——基于耐心资本调节机制的分析

IF 4.8 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Fang Fang, Dan Chen
{"title":"高管股权激励能否增强企业偿债能力?——基于耐心资本调节机制的分析","authors":"Fang Fang,&nbsp;Dan Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.iref.2025.104347","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2023, this study constructs a panel model to analyze the specific impact of executive equity incentives on corporate debt-paying capacity, and innovatively incorporates patient capital as a moderating variable into the analytical framework. Empirical results indicate that executive equity incentives are significantly positively correlated with corporate debt-paying capacity; patient capital plays a substantial moderating role in the transmission path by which executive equity incentives affect debt-paying capacity; the effect of executive equity incentives on corporate debt-paying capacity is more pronounced in private enterprises (PEs) than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the enhancement of debt-paying capacity through executive equity incentives is significantly stronger in high-tech enterprises compared to non-high-tech enterprises.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":14444,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Economics & Finance","volume":"102 ","pages":"Article 104347"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Can executive equity incentives enhance corporate debt-paying ability?—An analysis based on the moderating mechanism of patient capital\",\"authors\":\"Fang Fang,&nbsp;Dan Chen\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.iref.2025.104347\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2023, this study constructs a panel model to analyze the specific impact of executive equity incentives on corporate debt-paying capacity, and innovatively incorporates patient capital as a moderating variable into the analytical framework. Empirical results indicate that executive equity incentives are significantly positively correlated with corporate debt-paying capacity; patient capital plays a substantial moderating role in the transmission path by which executive equity incentives affect debt-paying capacity; the effect of executive equity incentives on corporate debt-paying capacity is more pronounced in private enterprises (PEs) than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the enhancement of debt-paying capacity through executive equity incentives is significantly stronger in high-tech enterprises compared to non-high-tech enterprises.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":14444,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Review of Economics & Finance\",\"volume\":\"102 \",\"pages\":\"Article 104347\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-06-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Review of Economics & Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056025005106\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Economics & Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056025005106","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究基于2011 - 2023年沪深两市a股上市公司数据,构建面板模型分析高管股权激励对企业偿债能力的具体影响,并创新地将耐心资本作为调节变量纳入分析框架。实证结果表明,高管股权激励与企业偿债能力显著正相关;在高管股权激励影响偿债能力的传导路径中,耐心资本起着实质性的调节作用;高管股权激励对企业偿债能力的影响在民营企业中比在国有企业中更为明显;高技术企业通过高管股权激励提高偿债能力的效果明显强于非高技术企业。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Can executive equity incentives enhance corporate debt-paying ability?—An analysis based on the moderating mechanism of patient capital
Based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2023, this study constructs a panel model to analyze the specific impact of executive equity incentives on corporate debt-paying capacity, and innovatively incorporates patient capital as a moderating variable into the analytical framework. Empirical results indicate that executive equity incentives are significantly positively correlated with corporate debt-paying capacity; patient capital plays a substantial moderating role in the transmission path by which executive equity incentives affect debt-paying capacity; the effect of executive equity incentives on corporate debt-paying capacity is more pronounced in private enterprises (PEs) than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the enhancement of debt-paying capacity through executive equity incentives is significantly stronger in high-tech enterprises compared to non-high-tech enterprises.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
2.20%
发文量
253
期刊介绍: The International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF) is a scholarly journal devoted to the publication of high quality theoretical and empirical articles in all areas of international economics, macroeconomics and financial economics. Contributions that facilitate the communications between the real and the financial sectors of the economy are of particular interest.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信