共同的机构投资者和竞争对手公司的董事会代表

IF 7.2 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102836

Heng Geng , Harald Hau , Roni Michaely , Binh Hoang Nguyen

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引用次数: 0

摘要

共同机构所有权的大幅增加引发了合理的反垄断担忧。虽然普通机构股东可能影响公司政策的确切渠道尚不清楚，但一个突出的潜在机制是公司董事会代表。通过使用手工收集的股东董事会代表数据，我们发现机构投资者同时持有竞争对手公司董事会职位的情况非常罕见，并且不能解释共同机构所有权与公司对盈利能力之间的正相关关系。我们的研究结果表明，机构投资者的董事会代表权不太可能代表影响公司政策的经验有效渠道。

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Common institutional investors and board representation in rival firms

The large increase in common institutional ownership has raised legitimate antitrust concerns. While the exact channel by which common institutional shareholders might influence firm policy remains unclear, a prominent potential mechanism is corporate board representation. Using hand-collected data on shareholders' board representation, we show that instances of institutional investors simultaneously holding board positions in rival companies are exceedingly rare and do not account for the positive correlation between common institutional ownership and firm-pair profitability. Our findings suggest that board representation by institutional investors is unlikely to represent an empirically potent channel of influence on corporate policy.

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来源期刊

Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.80

自引率

3.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.