{"title":"新安河流域生态补偿试点中个体预期政策效用驱动机制研究","authors":"Xuan Dong , Ke Jiang","doi":"10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2025.107797","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Watershed ecological compensation (WEC) has emerged as an essential tool for promoting regional coordinated development through reconciling the conflicting interests between watershed individuals. While the objective interests of the investors and suppliers in the WEC project are considered in practice, psychological factors also significantly influence the strategic decisions. To examine the impact of expected policy utility on individual behavior and to facilitate effective WEC implementation, this study focuses on China's first inter-provincial WEC pilot in the Xin'an River Basin (XRB). An evolutionary game model grounded in prospect theory is developed to capture behavioral dynamics under uncertainty. The evolution and steady state strategies of individuals are then separately discussed based on replicated dynamics equations. Furthermore, a numerical simulation based on the WEC-XRB project is conducted to examine the evolutionary stabilization strategies and validate the findings. Key findings indicate that: (1) the strategic decisions within the WEC-XRB project are characterized by continuous interaction and optimization influenced by subjective valuations; (2) augmented unilateral default costs and higher penalty proportions significantly bolster participation incentives; (3) investors exhibiting elevated loss aversion are predisposed to engage in the project, whereas suppliers demonstrate a contrasting tendency; and (4) an increased risk preference coefficient may serve as a catalyst for more proactive stakeholder engagement. These insights offer a robust framework for policymakers to refine WEC mechanisms and enhance sustainable inter-regional collaboration.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54698,"journal":{"name":"Ocean & Coastal Management","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 107797"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does individuals' expected policy utility drive watershed ecological compensation in China's Xin'an river basin pilot?\",\"authors\":\"Xuan Dong , Ke Jiang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2025.107797\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Watershed ecological compensation (WEC) has emerged as an essential tool for promoting regional coordinated development through reconciling the conflicting interests between watershed individuals. While the objective interests of the investors and suppliers in the WEC project are considered in practice, psychological factors also significantly influence the strategic decisions. To examine the impact of expected policy utility on individual behavior and to facilitate effective WEC implementation, this study focuses on China's first inter-provincial WEC pilot in the Xin'an River Basin (XRB). An evolutionary game model grounded in prospect theory is developed to capture behavioral dynamics under uncertainty. The evolution and steady state strategies of individuals are then separately discussed based on replicated dynamics equations. Furthermore, a numerical simulation based on the WEC-XRB project is conducted to examine the evolutionary stabilization strategies and validate the findings. Key findings indicate that: (1) the strategic decisions within the WEC-XRB project are characterized by continuous interaction and optimization influenced by subjective valuations; (2) augmented unilateral default costs and higher penalty proportions significantly bolster participation incentives; (3) investors exhibiting elevated loss aversion are predisposed to engage in the project, whereas suppliers demonstrate a contrasting tendency; and (4) an increased risk preference coefficient may serve as a catalyst for more proactive stakeholder engagement. These insights offer a robust framework for policymakers to refine WEC mechanisms and enhance sustainable inter-regional collaboration.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":54698,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ocean & Coastal Management\",\"volume\":\"269 \",\"pages\":\"Article 107797\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-06-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ocean & Coastal Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"93\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569125002595\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"环境科学与生态学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"OCEANOGRAPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ocean & Coastal Management","FirstCategoryId":"93","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569125002595","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"环境科学与生态学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"OCEANOGRAPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Does individuals' expected policy utility drive watershed ecological compensation in China's Xin'an river basin pilot?
Watershed ecological compensation (WEC) has emerged as an essential tool for promoting regional coordinated development through reconciling the conflicting interests between watershed individuals. While the objective interests of the investors and suppliers in the WEC project are considered in practice, psychological factors also significantly influence the strategic decisions. To examine the impact of expected policy utility on individual behavior and to facilitate effective WEC implementation, this study focuses on China's first inter-provincial WEC pilot in the Xin'an River Basin (XRB). An evolutionary game model grounded in prospect theory is developed to capture behavioral dynamics under uncertainty. The evolution and steady state strategies of individuals are then separately discussed based on replicated dynamics equations. Furthermore, a numerical simulation based on the WEC-XRB project is conducted to examine the evolutionary stabilization strategies and validate the findings. Key findings indicate that: (1) the strategic decisions within the WEC-XRB project are characterized by continuous interaction and optimization influenced by subjective valuations; (2) augmented unilateral default costs and higher penalty proportions significantly bolster participation incentives; (3) investors exhibiting elevated loss aversion are predisposed to engage in the project, whereas suppliers demonstrate a contrasting tendency; and (4) an increased risk preference coefficient may serve as a catalyst for more proactive stakeholder engagement. These insights offer a robust framework for policymakers to refine WEC mechanisms and enhance sustainable inter-regional collaboration.
期刊介绍:
Ocean & Coastal Management is the leading international journal dedicated to the study of all aspects of ocean and coastal management from the global to local levels.
We publish rigorously peer-reviewed manuscripts from all disciplines, and inter-/trans-disciplinary and co-designed research, but all submissions must make clear the relevance to management and/or governance issues relevant to the sustainable development and conservation of oceans and coasts.
Comparative studies (from sub-national to trans-national cases, and other management / policy arenas) are encouraged, as are studies that critically assess current management practices and governance approaches. Submissions involving robust analysis, development of theory, and improvement of management practice are especially welcome.