自我说服并不意味着自我欺骗

IF 2.8 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Yunhao Zhang , David G. Rand
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引用次数: 0

摘要

现有理论认为,“自我说服”效应,即个体被激励去说服他人,调整自己的信念以符合自己的说服目标,是源于说服他人动机的自我欺骗的结果。在这里,我们提出了另一种解释:我们认为自我说服可能仅仅是通过优先接触目标一致的论点而产生的。然后,我们提供经验证据支持我们的替代帐户使用预先注册的实验,其中参与者被分配到激励说服任务或激励总结任务。我们的研究1 (N = 1609)和研究2 (N = 2399)都发现在两种任务条件下,自我说服的水平是相等的。此外,在研究2中,在说服任务之前完成总结任务显著降低了随后的自我说服效果(自我说服效果降低了5倍)。总之,这些结果表明,“自我说服”效应实际上并不是由说服的动机驱动的。相反,自我说服似乎仅仅是由于接触到与目标一致的信息而产生的。这些发现挑战了传统观点,表明:(1)自我欺骗不是自我说服背后的主要机制;(2)在利用自我说服效应作为说服技巧时,说服动机并不重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Self-persuasion does not imply self-deception
Existing theory argues that the “self-persuasion” effect, whereby individuals who are incentivized to persuade others adjust their own beliefs to align with their persuasion goals, is a consequence of self-deception stemming from the motive to persuade others. Here, we propose an alternative explanation: we argue that self-persuasion may arise through simply being preferentially exposed to goal-aligned arguments. We then provide empirical evidence supporting our alternative account using pre-registered experiments in which participants were assigned to either an incentivized persuasion task or an incentivized summary task. Both our Study 1 (N = 1609) and Study 2 (N = 2399) found an equal level of self-persuasion in both task conditions. Furthermore, in Study 2, completing a summary task before the persuasion task significantly reduced the subsequent self-persuasion effect (five times less self-persuasion). Together, these results suggest that the “self-persuasion” effect is not actually driven by a motive to persuade. Instead, self-persuasion appears to arise simply due to exposure to goal-aligned information. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom, suggesting that (1) self-deception is not the primary mechanism behind self-persuasion; and (2) when leveraging the self-persuasion effect as a persuasion technique, the motive to persuade is not essential.
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来源期刊
Cognition
Cognition PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
283
期刊介绍: Cognition is an international journal that publishes theoretical and experimental papers on the study of the mind. It covers a wide variety of subjects concerning all the different aspects of cognition, ranging from biological and experimental studies to formal analysis. Contributions from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, ethology and philosophy are welcome in this journal provided that they have some bearing on the functioning of the mind. In addition, the journal serves as a forum for discussion of social and political aspects of cognitive science.
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