Introducing institutional design principles for transforming on-ground biosecurity

Context

There are calls for a transformation in biosecurity, including disease surveillance, at all levels to prevent and respond effectively to rising risks of animal, human, and zoonotic epidemics and pandemics. Many nations are adopting new technologies to transform biosecurity systems. However, limited attention is given to the role of institutions (regulations, rules, and organisations) essential for enabling these transformations. Aspects of biosecurity, such as on-ground general surveillance and biosecurity, generate social dilemmas that require unique institutional and governance arrangements to discourage free riding, prevent coordination failures, and support collective action across scales.

Objective

To assess the fitness of current institutions governing on-ground biosecurity and general animal health surveillance (BGAHS) in supporting coordinated collective action against growing biosecurity threats and to generate analytical insights for policy, practice, and research.

Methods

We use Australia as a case study, a nation with strong biosecurity and recognised shared responsibility among stakeholders. We apply theories on public goods, common-pool resources, and social dilemmas to characterise on-ground BGAHS. We briefly describe Australia's general surveillance and broader biosecurity systems through an institutional lens based on research involving literature reviews, interviews, and focus groups with government, industry stakeholders, and leaders of successful animal health partnerships. We explore how existing rules and governance of BGAHS align with Elinor Ostrom's institutional design principles and recent additions to enable effective collective action. Finally, we synthesise insights on institutional design principles for BGAHS policy, practice, and research in Australia and similar contexts.

Results and Conclusions

We found that aspects of on-ground biosecurity generate public good social dilemmas. However, despite Australia's strong reputation, current governance arrangements, including general surveillance, give limited attention to institutional design principles.

Significance

This article offers insights for transforming biosecurity governance. A key policy implication is that shared responsibility needs to shift from individualised risk and responsibility to coordinated collective action. While devolving responsibility is important, it must be matched with rights and resources to support decision-making and implementation across scales.

For practice, a crucial insight is the need to design nested institutions that foster collective action locally, where on-ground BGAHS is embedded in the everyday activities of farmers and stakeholders. This requires locally driven institutions aligned with state and national systems.

A research insight is that while existing institutional design principles are a good foundation, more research is needed to revise and develop new principles that address the unique social dilemmas and public goods aspects of biosecurity.