董事会风险委员会和风险因素披露基调

Muhammad Farhan Malik, Yuan George Shan, Jamie Yixing Tong, Frank Feida Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了董事会风险委员会(BRC)对风险因素披露(RFD)向上基调管理的影响。基于2005 - 2019年美国上市金融公司的样本,我们发现BRC的存在与RFD中较少的向上基调管理相关,这表明BRC加强了风险治理监督,并约束了管理者战略性地偏向披露基调。brc对缓解向上基调管理的影响在不同类别的风险披露中都存在。进一步分析发现,BRC的规模、独立性和财务专家董事比例与RFD的向上基调呈负相关,凸显了BRC结构因素的重要性。brc还提高了信息披露的可读性,同时减少了不确定性和模糊性。此外,我们的横断面分析表明,强制性和自愿采用BRC都有助于降低RFD的上升趋势。然而,这种影响仅在多德-弗兰克法案实施后才显著,这表明该法案实施后风险监管得到了加强。最后,差异中的差异测试提供了进一步的保证,以防止内生性问题。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,brc在抑制管理动机操纵RFD语言方面发挥了至关重要的作用,最终提高了风险披露的质量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Board risk committees and risk factor disclosures tone
We investigate the impact of the board risk committee (BRC) on upward tone management in risk factor disclosures (RFD). Based on a sample of U.S. listed financial firms from 2005 to 2019, we find that the presence of a BRC is associated with less upward tone management in RFD, suggesting that BRCs enhance risk governance oversight and constrain managers from strategically biasing disclosure tone. BRCs' impact on mitigating upward tone management holds across different categories of risk disclosures. Further analysis shows that BRC size, independence, and the proportion of financial expert directors are negatively associated with upward tone in RFD, highlighting the importance of BRCs' structural factors. BRCs also improve disclosure readability while reducing uncertainty and ambiguity. Moreover, our cross-sectional analyses indicate that both mandatory and voluntary BRC adoption contribute to lower upward tone in RFD. However, this effect is significant only in the post-Dodd-Frank Act period, suggesting strengthened risk oversight following the Act's implementation. Finally, difference-in-differences tests provide further assurance against endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings suggest that BRCs play a crucial role in curbing managerial incentives to manipulate RFD language, ultimately improving the quality of risk disclosures.
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