物流车电动化：补贴还是处罚？三方进化博弈分析

IF 7.3 1区工程技术 Q1 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES

Transportation Research Part D-transport and Environment Pub Date : 2025-06-05 DOI:10.1016/j.trd.2025.104838

Quanzhou Tao , Wen Yang , Huiling Zhu , Jianhua Ma , Yanchun Pan , Xin Li

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨在不同政策措施下，制造商、物流公司和租赁公司在推广电动物流汽车方面的战略互动。利用三方演化博弈模型，分析了研究补贴、充电站补贴、道路准入特权和排放处罚对利益相关者策略的影响。基于现实世界数据的理论分析和数值模拟表明，独立策略无法实现所有利益相关者完全过渡到elv的理想均衡。在政策措施中，对内燃机物流车（iclv）的处罚是最有效的初步措施。这些政策鼓励物流公司采用电动汽车，并激励制造商优先考虑电动汽车的研究，但对租赁公司的影响有限。充电站建设补贴在吸引租赁企业方面起着举足轻重的作用。我们还确定了平衡过渡速度和成本效益的最佳政策组合。此外，重新分配充电站建设的研究补贴进一步加速了这一转变。

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Electrification of logistics vehicles: Subsidies or penalties? A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

This study examines the strategic interactions among manufacturers, logistics companies, and leasing companies in promoting electric logistics vehicles (ELVs) under different policy measures. Using a tripartite evolutionary game model, we analyze the impact of research subsidies, charging station subsidies, road access privileges, and emission penalties on stakeholder strategies. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations based on real-world data reveal that standalone policies fail to achieve the ideal equilibrium where all stakeholders fully transition to ELVs. Among policy measures, penalties for internal combustion logistics vehicles (ICLVs) are the most effective initial measures. These policies encourage logistics companies to adopt ELVs and motivate manufacturers to prioritize ELV research, but have limited influence on leasing companies. Charging station construction subsidies play a pivotal role in engaging leasing companies. We also identify the optimal policy mix to balance transition speed and cost-effectiveness. In addition, reallocating research subsidies to charging station construction accelerates the transition further.

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来源期刊

Transportation Research Part D-transport and Environment 工程技术-运输科技

CiteScore

14.40

自引率

9.20%

发文量

314

审稿时长

39 days

期刊介绍： Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment focuses on original research exploring the environmental impacts of transportation, policy responses to these impacts, and their implications for transportation system design, planning, and management. The journal comprehensively covers the interaction between transportation and the environment, ranging from local effects on specific geographical areas to global implications such as natural resource depletion and atmospheric pollution. We welcome research papers across all transportation modes, including maritime, air, and land transportation, assessing their environmental impacts broadly. Papers addressing both mobile aspects and transportation infrastructure are considered. The journal prioritizes empirical findings and policy responses of regulatory, planning, technical, or fiscal nature. Articles are policy-driven, accessible, and applicable to readers from diverse disciplines, emphasizing relevance and practicality. We encourage interdisciplinary submissions and welcome contributions from economically developing and advanced countries alike, reflecting our international orientation.