双渠道供应链中的价格粘性

IF 2.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-05 DOI:10.1002/mde.4501

Ismail Saglam

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了双渠道供应链中制造商直接通过在线零售商和间接通过线下零售商销售产品的价格粘性问题。我们构建了一个非合作博弈，其中制造商和线下零售商决定是否在需求冲击后无成本地调整价格。如果需求冲击是正的，那么在唯一纳什均衡下没有价格是粘性的。如果需求冲击是负的，那么我们就会观察到一些或所有价格都具有粘性的均衡。我们也证明了没有均衡总是帕累托最优的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Price Stickiness in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

In this paper, we investigate price stickiness in a dual-channel supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product directly through an online retailer and indirectly through an offline retailer. We construct a noncooperative game where the manufacturer and the offline retailer decide whether or not to costlessly adjust their prices after a demand shock. If the demand shock is positive, then no price can be sticky at the unique Nash equilibrium. If the demand shock is negative, then we additionally observe equilibria where some or all prices can be sticky. We also show that no equilibrium is always Pareto optimal.

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.