Behavioral Genetics and Human Agency: How Selectively Deterministic Theories of Free Will Drive Unwarranted Opposition to Behavioral Genetic Research and Undermine Our Moral and Legal Conventions, Part I.

This article argues that a pervasive but confused theory of free will is driving unwarranted resistance to behavioral genetic research and undermining the concept of personal responsibility enshrined in our moral and legal conventions. We call this the theory of 'free-will-by-subtraction'. A particularly explicit version of this theory has been propounded by the psychologist Eric Turkheimer, who has proposed that human agency can be scientifically quantified as the behavioral variation that remains unexplained after known genetic and environmental causes have been accounted for. This theory motivates resistance to research that suggests genetic differences substantially account for differences in human behavior because that is seen to reduce the scope of human freedom. In academic philosophy, free-will-by-subtraction theory corresponds to a position called 'libertarian incompatibilism', which holds that human beings are not responsible for behavior that has extrinsic causes yet maintains that free will nonetheless exists because some fraction of human behavior is self-caused. However, this position is rejected by most professional philosophers. We argue that libertarian incompatibilism is inconsistent with a secular materialist outlook in which all human behavior is understood to have extrinsic causes whether those causes are known to science or not - an outlook Turkheimer shares. We show that Turkheimer sustains this contradiction by adopting an untenable position we call 'epistemic libertarianism', which holds that extrinsic causes of our behavior only infringe on our freedom if we know about them. By contrast, the overwhelming majority of secular materialist philosophers support a position called 'compatibilism', which maintains that free will is compatible with the comprehensive extrinsic causation of human behavior. We show that compatibilism neutralizes the threat that genetic explanation poses to human agency and rescues a generous conception of personal responsibility that aligns with our moral intuitions.