考虑补贴和不同交易契约的生鲜产品供应链管理决策研究。

IF 2.9 3区 综合性期刊 Q1 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES
PLoS ONE Pub Date : 2025-05-29 eCollection Date: 2025-01-01 DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0322800
Yunting Wu, Aimin Zhu, Lijuan Yu, Wenbo Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着人们生活水平的不断提高和对优质生鲜产品需求的不断增加,提高生鲜产品的质量已成为一个迫切需要关注的关键问题。已有研究表明,加强生鲜产品在产地的保鲜能力,可以有效提高产品质量。因此,本文从提高原产地保鲜水平的角度出发,考虑从政府和零售商两方面对供应商进行财政补贴,引入供应商风险规避行为因素,分别构建并求解批发价格契约、成本分担契约、收益分担契约、并以转移支付契约为研究对象,探讨政府补贴和风险规避如何影响成员的最优决策、产品的新鲜度和供应链的效用水平。研究结果表明:(1)政府补贴的增加对生鲜产品供应链的运行产生了积极的影响,提高了批发价格、保鲜力度、销售价格和供应链的整体效用水平。(2)供应商的风险规避导致转移支付成本、批发价格和保鲜努力的降低,但这反过来又会促使零售商降低销售价格,从而提高零售商和供应链实体的效用水平。(3)在转移支付合同和成本分担比高的成本分担合同中,供应商的保鲜度努力更高。在转移支付契约下,供应商和供应链实体的效用水平最高,而零售商的最有效效用水平取决于供应商的风险规避阈值。当超过这个阈值时,它将转向成本分摊合同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A study on fresh product supply chain management decisions considering subsidies and different transaction contracts.

With the continuous improvement of people's living standards and the increasing demand for high-quality fresh products, enhancing the quality of fresh products has become an urgent and crucial issue that requires attention. Existing studies have shown that strengthening the preservation capacity of fresh products at the origin can effectively improve product quality. Therefore, this paper starts from the perspective of enhancing the freshness preservation level at the origin, considering providing financial subsidies to the supplier from both the government and the retailer's side, introducing the factor of supplier risk aversion behavior, and respectively constructing and solving the Stackelberg game models under wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract, revenue-sharing contract, and transfer payment contract to explore how government subsidies and risk aversion affect the optimal decisions of members, the freshness of products, and the utility level of the supply chain. The research results indicate that: (1) The increase in government subsidies has a positive impact on the operation of the fresh product supply chain, which will raise wholesale prices, freshness preservation efforts, selling prices, and the overall utility level of the supply chain. (2) The risk aversion of supplier leads to a reduction in transfer payment costs, wholesale prices, and freshness preservation efforts, but this will, in turn, prompt retailer to lower selling prices, thereby enhancing the utility levels of both the retailer and the supply chain entity. (3) The freshness preservation effort by the supplier is higher in transfer payment contracts and cost-sharing contracts with a high cost-sharing ratio. Under transfer payment contracts, supplier and supply chain entity achieve the highest utility levels, while the most efficient utility level of retailer depends on the risk aversion threshold of supplier. When this threshold is exceeded, it will switch to cost-sharing contracts.

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来源期刊
PLoS ONE
PLoS ONE 生物-生物学
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
5.40%
发文量
14242
审稿时长
3.7 months
期刊介绍: PLOS ONE is an international, peer-reviewed, open-access, online publication. PLOS ONE welcomes reports on primary research from any scientific discipline. It provides: * Open-access—freely accessible online, authors retain copyright * Fast publication times * Peer review by expert, practicing researchers * Post-publication tools to indicate quality and impact * Community-based dialogue on articles * Worldwide media coverage
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