与不被承认的卫生当局进行卫生系统治理合作:阿富汗和叙利亚西北部的政治经济分析。

IF 3.1 2区 医学 Q2 PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
Anna Paterson, Jennifer Palmer, Egbert Sondorp
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引用次数: 0

摘要

背景:政府通常是卫生系统治理的主要行为者,但在一些受冲突影响的情况下,政府或同等的卫生当局未得到共同资助卫生系统的国际伙伴的正式承认。本研究考虑了2021年至24年在阿富汗和2013年至19年在叙利亚西北部,是什么阻碍或促进了两类未被承认的卫生当局与国际伙伴之间的合作。方法:文献回顾结合14个半结构化的关键信息提供者访谈,主要是与捐助者或联合国机构的代表(通常是卫生顾问)。使用了政治经济分析(PEA)分析框架,重点关注影响卫生系统主要行为者行为的能力、激励措施、信念、体制和结构因素。结果:虽然被广泛认为是一个关键障碍,但缺乏正式认可并不是合作的主要制约因素。冲突环境的稳定性、事实上的卫生当局生存的可能性、行为者之间存在冲突规范的程度,以及未被承认的当局和国际行为者的动机和“做事方式”也发挥了关键作用。例如,在阿富汗,塔利班对待妇女权利和教育的态度被认为是合作的主要障碍。另一方面,在叙利亚西北部,建立了高度技术性的卫生治理机构,并声称在职能上独立于受制裁的执政民兵,这大大促进了合作,保护了卫生系统。大多数受访者认为,国际行为体在国际法和组织任务规定的“红线”范围内与未被承认的卫生当局合作的空间更大,可以利用诸如支持卫生人力资源等有希望的切入点。在这些情况下,当局和国际伙伴就核心卫生系统战略和优先事项达成了重大共识。但是卫生当局希望——援助削减表明他们应该——对筹资和管理有更多的控制,而且他们自然比国际行动者更关注卫生系统的整体需求,而不是“紧急”援助。结论:国际合作伙伴和事实上的当局都可以采取行动,利用更多的业务空间进行合作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Health system governance cooperation with unrecognised health authorities: a political economy analysis in Afghanistan and Northwest Syria.

Background: The government is normally the leading actor in health system governance, yet in some conflict-affected contexts, government or equivalent health authorities are not formally recognised by the international partners who co-finance the health system. This study considers what has inhibited or facilitated cooperation between two types of non-recognised health authorities and international partners in Afghanistan from 2021 to 24 and Northwest Syria from 2013 to 19.

Methods: A literature review was combined with 14 semi-structured key informant interviews, mostly with representatives (often health advisers) of donors or UN agencies. A political economy analysis (PEA) analytical framework was used, focusing on the capacities, incentives, beliefs, institutional and structural factors that influenced the behaviour of the key health system actors.

Results: Although widely cited as a critical barrier, the lack of formal recognition was not the main constraint on cooperation. The in/stability of the conflict context, the likelihood of survival of de facto health authorities, the extent to which there were clashing norms between actors, and the incentives and 'ways of doing things' of both unrecognised authorities and international actors also played key roles. For example, in Afghanistan, the Taliban's approach to women's rights and education was identified as the major barrier to cooperation. In Northwest Syria, on the other hand, establishing health governance bodies that were strongly technical in focus and claimed functional independence from sanctioned ruling militias significantly boosted cooperation and protected the health system. Most interviewees felt there was more room for international actors to work with unrecognised health authorities within the "red lines" of international law and organisational mandates, using promising entry points such as supporting Human Resources for Health. There was significant agreement between authorities and international partners on the core health system strategies and priorities in these contexts. But health authorities wanted - and aid cuts suggested they should take - more control over financing and management, and they were naturally more focused than international actors on the holistic needs of the health system, beyond 'emergency' assistance.

Conclusions: International partners and de facto authorities can both take action to use more of the operational space for cooperation.

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来源期刊
Conflict and Health
Conflict and Health Medicine-Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
CiteScore
6.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
57
审稿时长
18 weeks
期刊介绍: Conflict and Health is a highly-accessed, open access journal providing a global platform to disseminate insightful and impactful studies documenting the public health impacts and responses related to armed conflict, humanitarian crises, and forced migration.
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