了解你的敌人:在竞赛中获取信息

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Zhuoqiong Chen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了在赢者通吃的竞争中获取竞争对手信息的动机和后果。在比赛前,每个玩家都可以从任意大的信号集中获得关于对手价值的私人信息。获得比对手更准确信号的玩家通常会以与对手相同的预期努力获胜。成为对手获取信息的目标并不会对玩家造成伤害,了解对方的部分信息对双方都有好处。然而,如果他们的信号的准确性不是公开可见的,他们可能会选择不获取任何信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Know thy enemy: Information acquisition in contests
This paper studies the incentives for and consequences of acquiring information about rivals in winner-take-all contests. Each player can acquire private information about the rival’s value from an arbitrarily large set of signals before the competition. A player who acquires a more accurate signal than their rival wins more often with the same expected effort as the rival. Being the target of a rival’s information acquisition does not harm the player, and learning partial information about each other benefits both players. Nevertheless, they may choose not to acquire any information if the accuracies of their signals are not publicly observable.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
3.60%
发文量
170
期刊介绍: The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.
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