进入暗市场和执行结果的不同途径

IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
James Brugler, Carole Comerton-Forde
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引用次数: 0

摘要

暗池可以限制特定交易者类型的访问。我们比较了限制高频交易者进入和不限制高频交易者进入的暗池之间的执行结果。研究发现,在访问限制较多的暗池中执行的交易比在访问限制较少的暗池中执行的交易具有更小的订单流信息泄漏、逆向选择风险和交易后订单不平衡。来自外源性暗池关闭的证据表明,这些差异是因果关系。分割订单流的能力可以让投资者受益,因为它允许他们在执行风险和信息泄露之间做出权衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Differential access to dark markets and execution outcomes
Dark pools can restrict access for specific trader types. We compare execution outcomes between dark pools that restrict high frequency trader access and those that do not. We find that trades executed in dark pools with more access restrictions have less order flow information leakage, adverse selection risk and post-trade order imbalances than trades in less restricted pools. Evidence from exogenous dark pool closures demonstrates that these differences are causal. The ability to segment order flow can benefit investors because it allows them to make trade-offs between execution risk and information leakage across different dark venues.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
15.80
自引率
4.50%
发文量
192
审稿时长
37 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.
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