激励供应商绩效:财务约束、信息延迟和智能合约

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Qiangqiang Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

很少有研究对多阶段环境下具有信息延迟的担保中介贸易融资中供应商的交付绩效进行研究。本文研究了动态担保融资模型(DGF),其中担保机构可以根据订单在交易过程中的不同阶段调整担保利率,并将其与统一担保融资模型(保证利率在整个过程中保持不变,UGF)进行比较。此外,我们还分析了信息延迟对供应商最优交货绩效的影响。本文的目的是对担保人中介贸易融资中从统一利率定价过渡到动态利率定价的潜在好处提供一个基本的理解。结果表明,DGF能够激励供应商提高其交付绩效,且激励价值随着交易过程的延长而增加。然而,信息延迟会对DGF的激励价值产生负面影响。智能合约可以通过加速信息验证过程来补充DGF。这些发现为在担保中介贸易融资中有效实施合同创新(如DGF)提供了指导,并强调了动态贸易过程和信息延迟如何影响供应商的交付绩效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Motivating Supplier Performance: Financial Constraints, Information Delay, and Smart Contracts
Few studies have investigated the delivery performance of suppliers in guarantor-intermediated trade finance with information delay in a multistage environment. This article examines a model of dynamic guarantee finance (DGF) where guarantee institutions can adjust guarantee rates as an order progresses through different stages in the trade process, and compare it with the uniform guarantee financing model (the guarantee rate remains constant over the process, UGF). In addition, we analyze the impact of information delay on the supplier's optimal delivery performance. The aim of this article is to provide a foundational understanding of the potential benefits associated with transitioning from uniform-rate pricing to dynamic-rate pricing in guarantor-intermediated trade finance. The results indicate that DGF can incentivize suppliers to enhance their delivery performance, with the incentive value increasing as the trade process becomes lengthier. However, information delay has a negative effect on the incentive value of DGF. Smart contracts can complement DGF by accelerating the process of information verification. These findings provide guidance for the effective implementation of contract innovations (such as DGF) in guarantor-intermediated trade finance and highlight how the dynamic trade process and information delay impact the supplier's delivery performance.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
19.00%
发文量
604
审稿时长
5.3 months
期刊介绍: Management of technical functions such as research, development, and engineering in industry, government, university, and other settings. Emphasis is on studies carried on within an organization to help in decision making or policy formation for RD&E.
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