货币主权与央行数字货币:未来跨境支付平台的竞争模式

IF 1.8 3区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Yanyang Chu, Nina Srinivasan Rathbun
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着各国央行开始采用数字货币(cbdc),出现了两个问题:对货币主权的影响以及跨境互操作性的潜在效率。前者尤其令新兴市场央行担忧,而后者则影响到所有国家。新兴市场已经使用资本流动管理(CFM)工具来控制可能过热和破坏宏观经济稳定的资本流动。CFM实施的有效性取决于cbdc如何进行跨境支付。本文讨论了CFM工具如何在不同的互操作性模型下工作。虽然跨境CBDC支付有三种广泛的模式,但关键的争论集中在两种替代方案上:轮辐模式和公共平台模式。国际清算银行(Bank of International Settlement)和各国央行正在参与的三个正在进行的项目对这两种模式进行了测试。本文比较了委托给私人中介机构的这些项目的差异,并注意到公共平台模型在实施特定司法管辖区的资本流动措施方面所展示的能力。最后对中国的e-CNY和资本流动工具进行了案例分析。各国在加入跨境平台时应考虑新兴市场的利益,使它们能够与其贸易和投资伙伴互动,同时避免破坏稳定的跨境流动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Monetary Sovereignty and Central Bank Digital Currencies: Competing Models for Future Cross-Border Payment Platforms

Monetary Sovereignty and Central Bank Digital Currencies: Competing Models for Future Cross-Border Payment Platforms

As central banks move to adopt digital currencies (CBDCs), two issues arise: the implications for monetary sovereignty and the potential efficiencies from cross-border interoperability. The former is particularly a concern for emerging market central banks, while the latter affects all states. Emerging markets have used capital flow management (CFM) tools to control capital flows that may overheat and destabilize the macroeconomy. The effectiveness of CFM implementation depends on how CBDCs carry out cross-border payments. This article discusses how CFM tools would function under different models of interoperability. While there are three broad models of cross-border CBDC payments, the key debate centers on two alternatives: the hub-and-spoke model and the common-platform model. Three ongoing projects, in which the Bank of International Settlement and central banks are participating, test these two models. This article compares the differences in these projects on a delegation to private intermediaries and notes the common platform model's demonstrated capacity for implementing jurisdiction-specific capital flow measures. It concludes with a case analysis of the Chinese e-CNY and capital flow tools. States should consider the interests of emerging markets in joining cross-border platforms that allow them to interact with their trading and investment partners while avoiding destabilizing cross-border flows.

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来源期刊
Global Policy
Global Policy Multiple-
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
10.50%
发文量
125
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