双寡头市场中的最优节能投资与杰文斯悖论

IF 13.6 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Energy Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-12 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108544

Kosuke Hirose , Toshihiro Matsumura

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究从理论上考察了双寡头企业的节能投资激励。首先，我们研究了一个二元选择模型，其中每个企业选择是否进行节能投资，然后他们面临古诺竞争。当竞争对手不参与这个项目时，我们专注于通过投资成为领先公司的激励。我们发现，如果征收庇古税，私人激励不足以提供福利（因此需要通过政策来促进）。然而，当排放税率低于庇古水平时，这种激励可能会过度。其次，我们研究了一个企业可以连续选择节能投资水平的模型。我们发现，当排放税率低于（等于）庇古时，均衡投资对于福利来说可能（不）是过度的。这些结果表明，低排放税和补贴相结合的政策形成促进节能投资可能损害福利。此外，我们发现应该对大幅创新而不是小幅提高能源效率进行补贴，因为前者不太可能导致杰文斯悖论。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Optimal energy-saving investments and Jevons Paradox in duopoly markets

This study theoretically investigates energy-saving investment incentives in duopolies. First, we investigate a binary choice model in which each firm chooses whether to make an energy-saving investment and then they face Cournot competition. We focus on the incentive to become the leading firm by the investment, when the rival does not engage in this project. We find the private incentive to be insufficient for welfare (thereby requiring promotion through policies), if Pigouvian tax is imposed. However, this incentive can be excessive when the emission tax rate is lower than the Pigouvian level. Next, we investigate a model in which firms can choose energy-saving investment levels continuously. We find that the equilibrium investment can be (is not) excessive for welfare when the emission tax rate is lower than (equal to) the Pigouvian. These results suggest that policy formation combining a low emission tax and subsidies for promoting energy-saving investments may harm welfare. Moreover, we find that drastic innovation rather than minor improvement of energy efficiency should be subsidized because the former less likely leads to Jevons paradox.

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来源期刊

Energy Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

12.50%

发文量

524

期刊介绍： Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.