The end of rebel rule: Biased peacekeeping interventions and social order

Since 2001, the United Nations Security Council has increasingly authorized interventions in support of a government. However, the potential impact of this trend on civil war processes is underexamined. I argue that biased peacekeeping interventions can undermine social order when replacing rebel territorial control. Interventions become associated with weak and predatory client governments, fail to build trust within communities, and create power vacuums. In the absence of a perceived impartial arbiter, mobilized groups turn to violence over disputes previously solved by the rebels. I test this theory by examining the impact of offensive operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Using novel data and a mixed-methods approach, I demonstrate AMISOM operations displacing rebel rule produced a significant increase in intercommunal conflict. These findings highlight the potential unintended consequences of multilateral interventions explicitly supporting one side. They further suggest biased interventions should focus on first improving governance before extending government control or prioritize shaping conditions for negotiated settlements.