堕胎和即将到来的人格。

IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q2 ETHICS
Bioethics Pub Date : 2025-05-03 DOI:10.1111/bioe.13423
Joel Cox
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引用次数: 0

摘要

很少有辩论能让人联想到围绕堕胎的辩论所带来的焦虑、情感和信念,而且理由很充分。这场辩论将多种相互竞争的利益带到了最前沿,包括自主权和对生命的尊重,同时以复杂的方式影响着个人生活、法律和政治。在这个讨论中,一个突出的问题是胎儿的地位:胎儿是一个现实的人还是仅仅是一个潜在的人?虽然这个问题似乎是谈话的核心,但它是基于对胎儿本质的错误看法。在本文中,我试图澄清胎儿的地位,希望重新定位这个争论在一个更有帮助的地方。我认为胎儿是一个即将到来的人,而不是一个潜在的人,即将到来的实体比潜在的实体具有更特殊的道德地位。为了提出这个论点,我首先提供关于胎儿的形而上学和道德地位的不同观点的背景,为我所支持的观点提供背景。然后,我定义并论证了迫近性的概念,解释了它与潜在性的区别,并赋予了胎儿更高的道德地位。最后,我回应了反对意见,包括关于迫在眉睫是否是存在的一个阶段的争论,胎儿是否可以既是迫在眉睫的人,也是潜在的人,以及胎儿的人格是否与围绕堕胎的辩论有关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Abortion and Imminent Personhood.

Few debates conjure the angst, emotion, and conviction of the debate surrounding abortion and for good reason. The debate brings to the forefront multiple competing goods, including autonomy and respect for life, while affecting individual lives, the law, and politics in complex ways. Within this discussion, one of the preeminent issues is the status of the fetus: Is the fetus an actualized person or merely a potential person? While this question appears to lie at the heart of the conversation, it is based on a misguided view about the nature of the fetus. In this paper, I attempt to clarify the status of the fetus to hopefully re-situate this debate in a more helpful place. I am arguing that a fetus is an imminent person rather than a potential person and that imminent entities have a special moral standing greater than that of potential entities. To make this argument, I first provide background on different views about the metaphysical and moral status of fetuses to provide context for the view that I espouse. Then, I define and argue for the concept of imminence, explaining how it is different from potentiality and grants a greater moral standing to fetuses. Finally, I respond to objections, including arguments concerning whether imminence is a stage of existence, whether the fetus can be both an imminent and a potential person, and whether the personhood of the fetus matters to the debate around abortion.

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来源期刊
Bioethics
Bioethics 医学-医学:伦理
CiteScore
4.20
自引率
9.10%
发文量
127
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: As medical technology continues to develop, the subject of bioethics has an ever increasing practical relevance for all those working in philosophy, medicine, law, sociology, public policy, education and related fields. Bioethics provides a forum for well-argued articles on the ethical questions raised by current issues such as: international collaborative clinical research in developing countries; public health; infectious disease; AIDS; managed care; genomics and stem cell research. These questions are considered in relation to concrete ethical, legal and policy problems, or in terms of the fundamental concepts, principles and theories used in discussions of such problems. Bioethics also features regular Background Briefings on important current debates in the field. These feature articles provide excellent material for bioethics scholars, teachers and students alike.
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