b区块链对电子平台真的有好处吗?消费者信任与渠道蚕食的双刃剑

IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Xiaoxi Zhu, Yu Chen, Minglun Ren, Wei Chu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

区块链技术在电商平台上的应用,使得产品更加可靠和可追溯,特别是来自没有品牌授权的第三方零售商的产品。然而,这项技术也将加剧授权零售商和第三方零售商之间的竞争。另一方面,作为中介,电商平台的利润也变得难以捉摸。我们的目标是研究区块链技术如何影响由一个制造商、一个电子平台和两个电子零售商组成的双渠道供应链的最优定价策略和利润分配。采用Stackelberg博弈框架,结果表明:(1)电子平台不一定从区块链中受益;只有当佣金率和单位使用成本都足够小(或大)时,平台才能获得更高的利润。(2)区块链的应用可以为第三方零售商带来额外的声誉收益,但两个渠道的零售价格也可能更高。(3)帕累托改进表明,当制造商以不同的价格向官方零售商和第三方零售商销售产品时,区块链实施成功的可能性增加。(4)当第三方零售商分担区块链使用成本时,其最优渠道价格上升,需求下降。对于官方零售商来说,价格的变化取决于竞争强度。在该策略下,制造商倾向于降低批发价格,既有利于电子零售商,又有利于提高产品竞争力和供应链效率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Is Blockchain Really Good for E-Platform? A Double-Edged Sword From Consumer Trust and Channel Cannibalization

The application of blockchain technology in e-platforms makes products more reliable and traceable, especially products from third-party retailers without brand authorization. However, this technology will also intensify the competition between authorized retailers and third-party retailers. On the other hand, as intermediaries, e-platforms' profits have also become elusive. We aim to investigate how blockchain technology impacts optimal pricing strategies and profit distribution in a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one e-platform, and two e-tailers. By adopting a Stackelberg game framework, the results show that (1) the e-platforms may not necessarily benefit from blockchain; only when the commission rate and unit usage cost are both small (or large) enough can the platform achieve higher profit. (2) The application of blockchain can yield extra reputation benefits for third-party retailer, while the retail prices of both channels may also be higher. (3) The Pareto improvements show that when manufacturer sells products to official retailer and third-party retailer at different prices, the possibility of successful blockchain implementation increases. (4) When the third-party retailer shares blockchain usage cost, its optimal channel price rises and demand decreases. For the official retailer, changes in pricing depend on competitive intensity. The manufacturer tends to reduce wholesale price under the strategy, benefiting both e-tailers and enhancing product competitiveness and supply chain efficiency.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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