{"title":"b区块链对电子平台真的有好处吗?消费者信任与渠道蚕食的双刃剑","authors":"Xiaoxi Zhu, Yu Chen, Minglun Ren, Wei Chu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4482","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>The application of blockchain technology in e-platforms makes products more reliable and traceable, especially products from third-party retailers without brand authorization. However, this technology will also intensify the competition between authorized retailers and third-party retailers. On the other hand, as intermediaries, e-platforms' profits have also become elusive. We aim to investigate how blockchain technology impacts optimal pricing strategies and profit distribution in a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one e-platform, and two e-tailers. By adopting a Stackelberg game framework, the results show that (1) the e-platforms may not necessarily benefit from blockchain; only when the commission rate and unit usage cost are both small (or large) enough can the platform achieve higher profit. (2) The application of blockchain can yield extra reputation benefits for third-party retailer, while the retail prices of both channels may also be higher. (3) The Pareto improvements show that when manufacturer sells products to official retailer and third-party retailer at different prices, the possibility of successful blockchain implementation increases. (4) When the third-party retailer shares blockchain usage cost, its optimal channel price rises and demand decreases. For the official retailer, changes in pricing depend on competitive intensity. The manufacturer tends to reduce wholesale price under the strategy, benefiting both e-tailers and enhancing product competitiveness and supply chain efficiency.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 4","pages":"2562-2582"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Is Blockchain Really Good for E-Platform? A Double-Edged Sword From Consumer Trust and Channel Cannibalization\",\"authors\":\"Xiaoxi Zhu, Yu Chen, Minglun Ren, Wei Chu\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/mde.4482\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n <p>The application of blockchain technology in e-platforms makes products more reliable and traceable, especially products from third-party retailers without brand authorization. However, this technology will also intensify the competition between authorized retailers and third-party retailers. On the other hand, as intermediaries, e-platforms' profits have also become elusive. We aim to investigate how blockchain technology impacts optimal pricing strategies and profit distribution in a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one e-platform, and two e-tailers. By adopting a Stackelberg game framework, the results show that (1) the e-platforms may not necessarily benefit from blockchain; only when the commission rate and unit usage cost are both small (or large) enough can the platform achieve higher profit. (2) The application of blockchain can yield extra reputation benefits for third-party retailer, while the retail prices of both channels may also be higher. (3) The Pareto improvements show that when manufacturer sells products to official retailer and third-party retailer at different prices, the possibility of successful blockchain implementation increases. (4) When the third-party retailer shares blockchain usage cost, its optimal channel price rises and demand decreases. For the official retailer, changes in pricing depend on competitive intensity. The manufacturer tends to reduce wholesale price under the strategy, benefiting both e-tailers and enhancing product competitiveness and supply chain efficiency.</p>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":18186,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Managerial and Decision Economics\",\"volume\":\"46 4\",\"pages\":\"2562-2582\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-02-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Managerial and Decision Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4482\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Managerial and Decision Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4482","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Is Blockchain Really Good for E-Platform? A Double-Edged Sword From Consumer Trust and Channel Cannibalization
The application of blockchain technology in e-platforms makes products more reliable and traceable, especially products from third-party retailers without brand authorization. However, this technology will also intensify the competition between authorized retailers and third-party retailers. On the other hand, as intermediaries, e-platforms' profits have also become elusive. We aim to investigate how blockchain technology impacts optimal pricing strategies and profit distribution in a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one e-platform, and two e-tailers. By adopting a Stackelberg game framework, the results show that (1) the e-platforms may not necessarily benefit from blockchain; only when the commission rate and unit usage cost are both small (or large) enough can the platform achieve higher profit. (2) The application of blockchain can yield extra reputation benefits for third-party retailer, while the retail prices of both channels may also be higher. (3) The Pareto improvements show that when manufacturer sells products to official retailer and third-party retailer at different prices, the possibility of successful blockchain implementation increases. (4) When the third-party retailer shares blockchain usage cost, its optimal channel price rises and demand decreases. For the official retailer, changes in pricing depend on competitive intensity. The manufacturer tends to reduce wholesale price under the strategy, benefiting both e-tailers and enhancing product competitiveness and supply chain efficiency.
期刊介绍:
Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.