官方发展援助能让专制势力固步自封吗?在乌干达、埃塞俄比亚和埃及调查捐助者推动的现金转移支付项目

IF 2 3区 经济学 Q2 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Guido Maschhaupt, Ahmed El Assal, Petronilla Wandeto
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引用次数: 0

摘要

越来越多的官方发展援助流向了选举专制国家。这是令人担忧的,因为援助有可能加剧受援国现有的权力不平等,尤其是那些更专制的国家。西方捐助者可能没有做好应对这些风险的准备,因为他们自己的激励结构侧重于具体的、技术的和短期的结果,而不是更广泛的政治考虑。一个特别令人关切的领域是现金转移,这既是西方捐助国优先考虑的主要政策,也是对实施这些政策的政权具有充分证据的政治利益的政策领域。本文考察了捐助者对选举专制国家现金转移的支持可能对专制堑壕产生的潜在负面和长期政治后果。报告重点介绍了选举专制国家现金转移支付项目的三个案例研究:乌干达的老年人补助项目、埃塞俄比亚的生产安全网项目以及埃及的塔卡富尔和卡拉马项目。本文运用比较政治经济学分析方法对三个案例进行分析,利用现有的期刊、报告和其他二手数据和灰色文献中的政治分析。执政政权可以利用现金转移支付方案使自己合法化,拉拢反对派团体,或补偿其他不受欢迎的改革。因此,它们的长期发展影响可能受到损害。特定的捐助者影响战略在参与庇护主义逻辑、利用财务杠杆并将公民社会排除在政策进程之外时,可能会产生强化政权巩固的意外效果。政策含义捐助者和政策制定者有责任对专制国家发展干预的适当性进行更批判性的思考。现金转移支付方案的长期负面政治后果可能不如受助人的短期利益明显,但从长远来看,它们可能超过短期利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Can ODA enable autocratic entrenchment? Investigating donor-driven cash transfer programmes in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt

Motivation

An increasing share of ODA goes to electoral autocratic states. This is concerning because aid carries the risk of entrenching existing power inequalities in recipient states, especially more autocratic ones. Western donors may not be well equipped to navigate these risks, given their own incentive structures to focus on concrete, technical, and short-term results, as opposed to broader political concerns.

One area of particular concern is cash transfers, which are both a major policy priority for Western donors and a policy area with well-documented political benefits for the regimes that implement them.

Purpose

This article examines the potentially negative and long-term political consequences that donor support for cash transfers in electoral autocratic states can have on autocratic entrenchment.

It focuses on three case studies of cash transfer programmes in electoral autocratic states: the Senior Citizens’ Grant in Uganda, the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, and the Takaful and Karama programme in Egypt.

Approach and methods

This article applies comparative political economy analysis to three case studies, drawing on existing political analyses in journals, reports, and other secondary data and grey literature.

Findings

Cash transfer programmes can be used by ruling regimes to legitimize themselves, to co-opt opposition groups, or to compensate for other unpopular reforms. As such, their long-term developmental impact can be jeopardized. Specific donor-influencing strategies can have the unintended effect of reinforcing regime entrenchment when they participate in clientelist logic, use financial leverage, and exclude civil society from the policy process.

Policy implications

Donors and policy-makers have a duty of care to think more critically about the appropriateness of development interventions in autocratic states. The negative long-term political consequences of cash transfer programmes may be less tangible than the short-term benefits to recipients, but they could outweigh them in the long run.

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来源期刊
Development Policy Review
Development Policy Review DEVELOPMENT STUDIES-
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
5.90%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: Development Policy Review is the refereed journal that makes the crucial links between research and policy in international development. Edited by staff of the Overseas Development Institute, the London-based think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues, it publishes single articles and theme issues on topics at the forefront of current development policy debate. Coverage includes the latest thinking and research on poverty-reduction strategies, inequality and social exclusion, property rights and sustainable livelihoods, globalisation in trade and finance, and the reform of global governance. Informed, rigorous, multi-disciplinary and up-to-the-minute, DPR is an indispensable tool for development researchers and practitioners alike.
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