地方税收捐赠制度下的政府间竞争如何影响地方政府效率？

IF 7.9 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Economic Analysis and Policy Pub Date : 2025-04-29 DOI:10.1016/j.eap.2025.04.035

Akinobu Ogawa , Haruo Kondoh

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在日本，2008年推出了一种独特的财政再分配制度，即家乡税捐赠制度。公民可以将部分居民税捐赠给不同的地方政府，而不是自己的地方政府。本文采用日本城市面板数据和随机前沿分析，考察了HTD对地方政府成本效率的影响。虽然其他地区提供的财政资源可能削弱居民对地方政府财政管理的监督，但捐助者有动力保持积极的监督。然而，我们发现，即使这种再分配是基于居民的意愿，其他地区获得的收入也会由于对公共服务成本的错误估计而阻碍地方政府的效率。凝胶的分类

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How does intergovernmental competition through hometown tax donation system affect local government efficiency?

In Japan, a unique fiscal redistribution system, the Hometown Tax Donation (HTD) system, was launched in 2008. Citizens may donate some of their inhabitant taxes to a different local government than their own. We examine the effects of the HTD on local governments’ cost efficiency, using panel data of Japanese municipalities and stochastic frontier analysis. While financial resources provided by other regions may weaken residents' monitoring of local government financial management, donors have an incentive to maintain active monitoring. However, we find that revenue received by other regions hinders efficiency of local governments by misestimation of the cost of public services, even if this redistribution is based on residents’ intentions.

JEL classification

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来源期刊

Economic Analysis and Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

9.80

自引率

9.20%

发文量

231

审稿时长

93 days

期刊介绍： Economic Analysis and Policy (established 1970) publishes articles from all branches of economics with a particular focus on research, theoretical and applied, which has strong policy relevance. The journal also publishes survey articles and empirical replications on key policy issues. Authors are expected to highlight the main insights in a non-technical introduction and in the conclusion.