在危难时刻展现出国家行动主义的力量

IF 7.9 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Economic Analysis and Policy Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI:10.1016/j.eap.2025.04.006

Aneta Hryckiewicz , Natalia Kryg , Dimitrios P. Tsomocos , Olha Zadorozhna

{"title":"在危难时刻展现出国家行动主义的力量","authors":"Aneta Hryckiewicz , Natalia Kryg , Dimitrios P. Tsomocos , Olha Zadorozhna","doi":"10.1016/j.eap.2025.04.006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact and role of government interventions in aiding troubled banks, focusing on changes in CEO positions and executive compensation. Using data from European and American banks between 2008 and 2018, we hypothesize that in a high-quality institutional environment together with powerful governments, government ownership in distressed institutions has a positive effect, manifesting in activism that leads to more frequent CEO turnover and reductions in executive pay. Furthermore, we investigate how such activism affects financial recovery. Our findings indicate that while state-implemented changes in CEO positions are associated with the recovery of distressed institutions, decreasing executive compensation often has the opposite effect. This research contributes to the ongoing discussion on the role of the state during periods of distress and the channels through which government ownership translates into tangible benefits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":54200,"journal":{"name":"Economic Analysis and Policy","volume":"86 ","pages":"Pages 1346-1376"},"PeriodicalIF":7.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Unveiling the power of state activism in times of distress\",\"authors\":\"Aneta Hryckiewicz , Natalia Kryg , Dimitrios P. Tsomocos , Olha Zadorozhna\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.eap.2025.04.006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>This study examines the impact and role of government interventions in aiding troubled banks, focusing on changes in CEO positions and executive compensation. Using data from European and American banks between 2008 and 2018, we hypothesize that in a high-quality institutional environment together with powerful governments, government ownership in distressed institutions has a positive effect, manifesting in activism that leads to more frequent CEO turnover and reductions in executive pay. Furthermore, we investigate how such activism affects financial recovery. Our findings indicate that while state-implemented changes in CEO positions are associated with the recovery of distressed institutions, decreasing executive compensation often has the opposite effect. This research contributes to the ongoing discussion on the role of the state during periods of distress and the channels through which government ownership translates into tangible benefits.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":54200,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Analysis and Policy\",\"volume\":\"86 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 1346-1376\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Analysis and Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0313592625001365\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Analysis and Policy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0313592625001365","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了政府干预在帮助陷入困境的银行方面的影响和作用，重点关注首席执行官职位和高管薪酬的变化。利用2008年至2018年欧洲和美国银行的数据，我们假设，在一个高质量的制度环境和强大的政府中，政府对陷入困境的机构的所有权会产生积极影响，表现为激进主义，导致CEO更频繁的离职和高管薪酬的减少。此外，我们调查了这种激进主义如何影响金融复苏。我们的研究结果表明，虽然国家实施的CEO职位变动与陷入困境的机构的复苏有关，但降低高管薪酬往往会产生相反的效果。这项研究有助于正在进行的关于国家在困难时期的作用以及政府所有权转化为有形利益的渠道的讨论。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Unveiling the power of state activism in times of distress

This study examines the impact and role of government interventions in aiding troubled banks, focusing on changes in CEO positions and executive compensation. Using data from European and American banks between 2008 and 2018, we hypothesize that in a high-quality institutional environment together with powerful governments, government ownership in distressed institutions has a positive effect, manifesting in activism that leads to more frequent CEO turnover and reductions in executive pay. Furthermore, we investigate how such activism affects financial recovery. Our findings indicate that while state-implemented changes in CEO positions are associated with the recovery of distressed institutions, decreasing executive compensation often has the opposite effect. This research contributes to the ongoing discussion on the role of the state during periods of distress and the channels through which government ownership translates into tangible benefits.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Economic Analysis and Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

9.80

自引率

9.20%

发文量

231

审稿时长

93 days

期刊介绍： Economic Analysis and Policy (established 1970) publishes articles from all branches of economics with a particular focus on research, theoretical and applied, which has strong policy relevance. The journal also publishes survey articles and empirical replications on key policy issues. Authors are expected to highlight the main insights in a non-technical introduction and in the conclusion.