考虑供应链断裂风险的供应链企业绿色生产决策演化博弈模型

IF 5 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Fulei Shi, Chuansheng Wang, Zhenfang Qin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

环境污染问题已经被广泛讨论,特别是在供应链的生产阶段。许多企业寻求创新,努力实现经济效益和环境效益的双赢。然而,企业之间的合作和竞争很可能导致供应链的中断。因此,本文将绿色生产策略与供应链风险管理相结合,构建供应商与制造商之间的演化博弈模型,深入了解供应链中断对供应商与制造商绿色生产策略选择的影响,揭示系统演化为不同稳定性策略的条件。结果表明:(1)在不同的条件下,系统会有一个进化稳定的策略。当供应商或制造商单独进行绿色生产的总收益大于支出,且供应链中断的成本大于绿色生产的投资成本与单独进行绿色生产的总收益之差时,系统将产生两种不同的演化结果。(2)供应商和制造商的合作意愿、绿色生产的投资成本、供应链断裂的风险系数都会影响系统的演化轨迹,这些因素与阈值的绝对差值越大,系统收敛速度越快。通过制定相关政策,使系统满足进化稳定策略(1,1)的条件,促进供应链上下游企业更快地实现协同绿色生产。本文有助于理解绿色供应链管理和进化博弈论,同时为供应链上的企业如何实现合作绿色生产以造福社会和环境提供了见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

An Evolutionary Game Model for Green Production Decisions of Supply Chain Enterprises Considering Supply Chain Break Risk

An Evolutionary Game Model for Green Production Decisions of Supply Chain Enterprises Considering Supply Chain Break Risk

The problem of environmental pollution has been extensively discussed, especially in the production phase of the supply chain. Many enterprises seek innovation and strive to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental benefits. However, the cooperation and competition between enterprises are likely to cause the interruption of the supply chain. Therefore, by combining the green production strategy with supply chain risk management, this paper builds an evolutionary game model between suppliers and manufacturers, to deeply understand the impact of supply chain disruption on the choice of the green production strategy by suppliers and manufacturers and reveal the conditions under which the system evolves into different stability strategies. The results show that (1) under different conditions, the system will have an evolutionarily stable strategy. When the total revenue of green production alone by the supplier or manufacturer is greater than the expenditure and the cost of supply chain disruption is greater than the difference between the investment cost of green production and the total revenue of green production alone, the system will produce two different evolution results. (2) The cooperation willingness of the supplier and manufacturer, the investment cost of green production, and the risk coefficient of supply chain break will all affect the evolution trajectory of the system, and the greater the absolute difference between these factors and the threshold, the faster the system convergence speed. By formulating relevant policies, the system can meet the conditions of evolutionary stability strategy (1, 1), which can promote the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain to realize cooperative green production faster. This paper contributes to the understanding of green supply chain management and evolutionary game theory, while providing insights into how companies along the supply chain can achieve cooperative green production for the benefit of society and the environment.

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来源期刊
International Journal of Intelligent Systems
International Journal of Intelligent Systems 工程技术-计算机:人工智能
CiteScore
11.30
自引率
14.30%
发文量
304
审稿时长
9 months
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Intelligent Systems serves as a forum for individuals interested in tapping into the vast theories based on intelligent systems construction. With its peer-reviewed format, the journal explores several fascinating editorials written by today''s experts in the field. Because new developments are being introduced each day, there''s much to be learned — examination, analysis creation, information retrieval, man–computer interactions, and more. The International Journal of Intelligent Systems uses charts and illustrations to demonstrate these ground-breaking issues, and encourages readers to share their thoughts and experiences.
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