一个易于处理的团体全付拍卖

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016

Stefano Barbieri , Iryna Topolyan

{"title":"一个易于处理的团体全付拍卖","authors":"Stefano Barbieri , Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution of the correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects of value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without correlation devices as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game in which players engage in costless <em>unmediated</em> preplay communication.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106016"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A tractable group all-pay auction\",\"authors\":\"Stefano Barbieri , Iryna Topolyan\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution of the correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects of value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without correlation devices as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game in which players engage in costless <em>unmediated</em> preplay communication.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48393,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"volume\":\"226 \",\"pages\":\"Article 106016\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053125000626\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053125000626","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑具有广泛努力互补性的群体全付拍卖，其中团队成员通过特定于群体的关联设备协调努力。在温和规则条件下，存在一个独特的平衡力分布，与相关装置的分布无关。我们描述了这种独特的努力分布，并分析了价值分散、互补性程度和群体规模的影响。我们表明，这种努力分配可以在没有相关设备的情况下实现，作为廉价谈话游戏的平衡结果，在这种游戏中，玩家参与无成本的无中介的游戏前交流。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

A tractable group all-pay auction

We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution of the correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects of value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without correlation devices as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game in which players engage in costless unmediated preplay communication.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.