游说、贸易和分配不当

IF 3.8 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of International Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jinteco.2025.104086

Jaedo Choi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了游说如何影响在一个次优世界的贸易福利收益。我开发了一个异构企业的开放经济模型，可以通过游说来影响企业特定的扭曲。随着贸易成本的下降，由于市场规模和游说利益之间的互补性，出口商增加了游说，影响了配置效率、企业进入，从而影响了贸易收益。我使用IV策略和美国公司级数据的间接推断来估计模型。有了游说，贸易收益会高出4%，这是由配置效率的大幅提高所驱动的，因为生产率更高的出口商增加了游说，减轻了它们最初不利的外生扭曲。然而，当选择是由外生扭曲驱动时，贸易可能会导致福利损失，而游说则会加剧这种损失。这些发现表明，企业微观层面的调整对贸易收益至关重要。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Lobbying, trade, and misallocation

This paper studies how lobbying affects welfare gains from trade in a second-best world. I develop an open economy model of heterogeneous firms that can lobby to influence firm-specific distortions. As trade costs decline, exporters increase lobbying due to the complementarity between market size and lobbying benefits, impacting allocative efficiency, firm entry, and consequently gains from trade. I estimate the model using an IV strategy and indirect inference with US firm-level data. Gains from trade are 4% higher with lobbying, driven by larger improvements in allocative efficiency as more productive exporters increase lobbying, mitigating their initially unfavorable exogenous distortions. However, when selection is driven by exogenous distortions, trade may cause welfare losses exacerbated by lobbying. These findings suggest that firms’ micro-level adjustments matter for gains from trade.

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来源期刊

Journal of International Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.80

自引率

6.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of International Economics is intended to serve as the primary outlet for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of international economics. These include, but are not limited to the following: trade patterns, commercial policy; international institutions; exchange rates; open economy macroeconomics; international finance; international factor mobility. The Journal especially encourages the submission of articles which are empirical in nature, or deal with issues of open economy macroeconomics and international finance. Theoretical work submitted to the Journal should be original in its motivation or modelling structure. Empirical analysis should be based on a theoretical framework, and should be capable of replication.