经济博弈中的理解

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Lina Koppel , David Andersson , Magnus Johannesson , Eirik Strømland , Gustav Tinghög
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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多学科依靠经济博弈来衡量亲社会行为。然而,人们担心参与者可能会误解这些游戏,从而使对结果的解释复杂化。本研究结合在线和实验室数据(共n = 1568)来评估受试者对五种标准经济博弈的理解:独裁者博弈、最后通牒博弈、信任博弈、公共产品博弈和囚徒困境。在线和实验室数据收集是分开进行的,对于在线数据收集,我们为两个独立的平台(多产和CloudResearch的MTurk Toolkit)收集数据。在每个数据集中,参与者进行所有五个游戏,并随机分配到有或没有激励正确答案的理解问题。结果表明,误解是普遍存在的:在网络样本中,误解的参与者比例从22%(独裁者游戏)到70%(信任游戏)不等,在实验室样本中从22%(独裁者游戏)到53%(公共物品游戏)不等。激励理解问题对误解没有显著影响,但计算能力与较低的误解有关。在一些游戏中,误解也预示着亲社会行为的增加。我们的研究结果表明,误解在解释亲社会行为时可能很重要,这使得从实验数据中得出关于社会偏好的明确推论变得更加复杂。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comprehension in economic games
Many disciplines rely on economic games to measure prosocial behavior. However, there is a concern that participants may misunderstand these games, complicating interpretation of results. This study combines online and laboratory data (total n = 1568) to assess subject comprehension of five standard economic games: the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, Public Goods Game, and Prisoner's Dilemma. The online and lab data collections are carried out separately and for the online data collection we collect data for two separate platforms (Prolific and CloudResearch's MTurk Toolkit). Within each data collection participants carry out all five games, and are randomized to comprehension questions with or without incentives for correct answers. Results indicate that misunderstanding is common: the proportion of participants who misunderstood ranged from 22 % (Dictator Game) to 70 % (Trust Game) in the online samples and from 22 % (Dictator Game) to 53 % (Public Goods Game) in the lab sample. Incentivizing the comprehension questions had no significant impact on misunderstanding, but numeracy was associated with lower misunderstanding. Misunderstanding also predicted increased prosocial behavior in several of the games. Our findings suggest that misunderstanding may be important in explaining prosocial behavior, making it more complicated to draw clear inferences about social preferences from experimental data.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
9.10%
发文量
392
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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