披露授权、信托和资产证券化

IF 3.1 1区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Lantian Liang , Harold H. Zhang , Feng Zhao , Xiaofei Zhao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用英国《金融监管条例》(Reg AB)中独特而新颖的披露授权门槛设置,研究了资产证券化中披露与信任之间的关系。在reg AB颁布后,我们观察到一大批发起人刚好低于披露门槛。可信度较低的发起人更有可能调整其投资组合规模,以保持在这一门槛以下,特别是当贷款发起人和交易发起人没有关联时,在这种情况下,披露在减少信息不对称方面发挥了更大的作用。此外,这些发起人更有可能歪曲贷款质量。我们的研究结果表明,信息披露与信任之间存在很强的关系——值得信任的发起人披露得更多,发放的贷款质量更高,而不值得信任的发起人披露得更少,发放的贷款质量更低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Disclosure mandate, trust, and asset securitization
Utilizing a unique and novel setting of disclosure mandate threshold under Regulation AB (Reg AB), we investigate the relationship between disclosure and trust in asset securitization. Post-Reg AB enactment, we observe a significant bunching of originators just below the disclosure threshold. Less trustworthy originators are more likely to adjust their portfolio sizes to remain below this threshold, particularly when loan originators and deal sponsors are unaffiliated, which are cases in which disclosure plays a greater role in reducing information asymmetry. Additionally, these originators are more likely to misrepresent loan quality. Our findings reveal a strong relationship between disclosure and trust—trustworthy originators disclose more and originate higher-quality loans, while less trustworthy originators disclose less and produce lower-quality loans.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
45
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Intermediation seeks to publish research in the broad areas of financial intermediation, financial market structure, corporate finance, risk management, and valuation.
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