动态银行和存款价值

IF 7.6 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-23 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13454

PATRICK BOLTON, YE LI, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了一个银行理论，其中银行不能完全控制存款流动。面对不可保险的贷款和存款冲击，银行动态管理贷款、批发融资、存款和股权。存款通过降低融资成本来创造价值。然而，当银行资本不足并面临违反杠杆要求的风险时，存款的边际价值可能变为负值，因为通过提高杠杆，存款流入增加了昂贵的股票发行的可能性。银行无法完全控制杠杆，这将它们与非存款中介区分开来。我们的模型建议对杠杆监管进行重新评估，并为低利率环境下的银行业提供新的视角。

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Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits

We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks' inability to fully control leverage distinguishes them from nondepository intermediaries. Our model suggests a reevaluation of leverage regulations and offers new perspectives on banking in a low-interest-rate environment.

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来源期刊

Journal of Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

12.90

自引率

2.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.