Cooperation dynamics of social dilemmas on an opinion-dependent weighted network

In real society, different individuals have different opinions on a certain issue, and individuals with similar views tend to become close gradually, while individuals with different opinions tend to become distant. Based on this fact, we propose a weighted spatial prisoner's dilemma game model with opinions to explore the impact of link weight change influenced by differences in opinions on the evolution of cooperation. The strength of social relationships is indicated by the link weight which is dynamically updated by the differences in views between individuals. We investigate the effects of changes in the link weight control parameter, tolerance control parameter, and link weight adjustment amplitude on the evolution of cooperation. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we find that a co-evolutionary mechanism of game strategies and link weights influenced by opinions can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. More specifically, cooperation can be favored by an increase in the link weight control parameter, a decrease in the tolerance control parameter, and an increase in link weight adjustment amplitude. Changes in these parameters increase the heterogeneity of the network and therefore facilitate cooperation. These results help us understand how selfish individuals in a social dilemma can adjust their social relationships based on opinion dynamics to facilitate cooperation.