Applauded not acclaimed? Implementation effectiveness of the tradable green certificate in renewable energy policy of China

As the key tool for policy to support the growth of renewable energy, the tradable green certificate (TGC) is intended to ensure the consumption of renewable energy and support the implementation of the “dual‑carbon” strategy in China. Polarization between the amount of TGC issued and traded, however, is an issue. Accordingly, this work first establishes a two-stage supply chain Nash equilibrium game model, which includes coal and green power enterprises and power grids. Secondly, from the power generation side, considering the establishment of the linkage between TGC market and carbon market, or from the sales side, adjusting the ways for the grid to fulfill the assessment tasks of renewable energy consumption, construct the game model. Finally, the effects of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) ratio and consumption ratio on the equilibrium solution under different policy scenarios are analyzed through numerical simulation comparison. This demonstrates that: TGC has a significant phenomenon of “applauded not acclaimed” because of the dominant position of the supply side and high price; considering the establishment of carbon market and TGC market convergence or on this basis to adjust the grid to complete the task of ways of consumption, can improve the demand for TGC, weakening the ratio of RPS and consumption of the changes in the price of TGC, so as to achieve that market to “applauded and acclaimed”. The above investigates the implementation effect of TGC under RPS and carbon caps, which provides an important reference for the implementation effectiveness and sustainable development of TGC.