任务上的错误比机会成本更能推动努力规避。

IF 3.7 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Jake R Embrey,Alice Mason,Chris Donkin,Ben R Newell
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在努力完成艰巨的任务(如电子邮件、评分)时,我们的注意力往往会被脱离的欲望所束缚。心理努力的机会成本理论认为,与其说我们的 "努力感 "是一种认知限制,不如说它是一种适应性信号,它能将我们从没有回报的任务中驱赶出来,转向有价值的替代任务;简而言之,这种信号能确保我们的认知资源不会花在毫无结果的追求上。当前的研究工作检验了努力的机会成本理论的主要预测:我们在认知要求较高的任务中的现象(努力感和厌烦感)以及随后的任务行为(反应时间和准确性)都会受到可用替代品价值的影响。在操纵替代任务的外在价值(即金钱奖励)和内在价值(即任务的愉快程度)的三个实验中,我们没有发现支持机会成本理论的有力证据。在实验 1 中,我们没有观察到替代任务的外在价值对参与者在主要任务中的主观评价或行为产生影响。在实验 2 和 3 中,虽然参与者对主要任务的主观评价(如努力感和无聊感)可能会受到替代品内在价值的影响,但我们观察到参与者的表现(以准确率和反应时间来衡量)并没有发生相应的变化。我们探讨了这些结果对认知努力厌恶理论的影响,并详细介绍了合理的替代模型,如错误厌恶。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, 版权所有)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
On-task errors drive effort avoidance more than opportunity costs.
While trying to complete arduous tasks (e.g., emails, grading), our attention is often mired by the desire to disengage. Opportunity cost theories of mental effort argue that rather than our "sense of effort" being a cognitive limitation, it is an adaptive signal which repels us from unrewarding tasks toward worthwhile alternatives; in short, this signal ensures our cognitive resources are not spent on fruitless pursuits. The current work tests the primary predictions of the opportunity cost theory of effort: That our phenomenology during a cognitively demanding task (sense of effort and boredom), and subsequent on-task behavior (response times and accuracy), are affected by the value of the available alternatives. Over three experiments, manipulating both the extrinsic value (i.e., monetary reward) and intrinsic value of alternative tasks (i.e., how enjoyable the task is), we find no strong evidence in favor of opportunity cost theories. In Experiment 1, we observe no effect of the extrinsic value of an alternative on participants' subjective ratings or behavior during a primary task. In Experiments 2 and 3, while participants' subjective ratings of a primary task (e.g., sense of effort and boredom) may be affected by the intrinsic value of an alternative, we observe no commensurate changes in participants' performance, as measured by accuracy and response times. We explore the consequences of these results for theories of cognitive effort aversion and detail plausible alternative models, such as error aversion. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
4.90%
发文量
300
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Psychology: General publishes articles describing empirical work that bridges the traditional interests of two or more communities of psychology. The work may touch on issues dealt with in JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, JEP: Human Perception and Performance, JEP: Animal Behavior Processes, or JEP: Applied, but may also concern issues in other subdisciplines of psychology, including social processes, developmental processes, psychopathology, neuroscience, or computational modeling. Articles in JEP: General may be longer than the usual journal publication if necessary, but shorter articles that bridge subdisciplines will also be considered.
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