供应链协同下零售商最优股票回购决策模型

IF 9.8 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Xin Li , Zihan Xu , Dexiang Mei , Yu Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

股权回购协议是缓解投资者与融资主体之间利益冲突的关键财务策略;与此同时,它们也向供应链公司发出了信心的信号。在零售(阿里巴巴集团)、社交电子商务(抖音)和科技(思科系统)等高增长行业,企业利用回购来提高市场可信度、稳定预期、优化供应链效率。本研究采用Stackelberg博弈模型来考察回购决策与供应链运作之间的相互作用。探讨供应链合作对零售商回购策略和供应链整体绩效的影响。研究结果表明,最优回购比例缓解了零售商、投资者和融资者之间的冲突,同时提高了包括私募股权公司和供应商在内的利益相关者之间的价值分配。这种协调促进了帕累托改进,并加强了供应链的稳定性。此外,供应链协作降低了回购控制权溢价,尽管零售商控制权集中度的提高削弱了合作激励。本研究为资本市场战略与供应链管理的整合提供了深刻的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal share repurchase decision model for retailers under supply chain collaboration
Equity repurchase agreements are a key financial strategy for mitigating conflicts of interest between investors and financing entities; at the same time, they signal confidence to supply chain firms. In high-growth sectors like retail (Alibaba Group), social e-commerce (TikTok), and technology (Cisco Systems), firms utilize repurchases to enhance market credibility, stabilize expectations, and optimize supply chain efficiency. This study employs a Stackelberg game model to examine the interaction between buyback decisions and supply chain operations. It explores how supply chain cooperation influences retailers' buyback strategies and the supply chain's overall performance. The findings suggest that an optimal buyback ratio alleviates conflicts among retailers, investors, and financiers while enhancing value distribution among stakeholders, including private equity firms and suppliers. Such coordination fosters Pareto improvements and strengthens supply chain stability. Additionally, supply chain collaboration reduces buyback control premiums, although greater retailer control concentration weakens cooperation incentives. This research offers profound insights into integrating capital market strategies and supply chain management.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
9.80%
发文量
366
期刊介绍: The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.
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