{"title":"联邦学习中基于交替出价的隐私保密支付分配","authors":"Suyeon Jin;Chaeyeon Cha;Hyunggon Park","doi":"10.1109/LSP.2025.3555386","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In federated learning (FL), it is essential to implement a payment allocation mechanism that compensates clients for the costs incurred from participating in FL tasks. In this letter, we formulate the payment allocation as a bargaining game between a global server and clients and adopt the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to achieve optimal and fair payment assignments among clients. Unlike existing payment allocation mechanisms that require the disclosure of private information from the clients, the proposed approach ensures privacy non-disclosure for bargaining. The key idea is to decompose the one-to-many bargaining game into independent one-to-one bargaining games and use alternating-offers, which do not require the disclosure of private information from clients. We design an alternating-offers strategy and acceptance criteria to ensure fair agreements without the private information of clients. Simulation results show that the proposed payment allocation strategy can fairly allocate payments to clients while maintaining the accuracy of the global server in FL tasks.","PeriodicalId":13154,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Signal Processing Letters","volume":"32 ","pages":"1500-1504"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Alternating Offer-Based Payment Allocation for Privacy Non-Disclosure in Federated Learning\",\"authors\":\"Suyeon Jin;Chaeyeon Cha;Hyunggon Park\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/LSP.2025.3555386\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In federated learning (FL), it is essential to implement a payment allocation mechanism that compensates clients for the costs incurred from participating in FL tasks. In this letter, we formulate the payment allocation as a bargaining game between a global server and clients and adopt the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to achieve optimal and fair payment assignments among clients. Unlike existing payment allocation mechanisms that require the disclosure of private information from the clients, the proposed approach ensures privacy non-disclosure for bargaining. The key idea is to decompose the one-to-many bargaining game into independent one-to-one bargaining games and use alternating-offers, which do not require the disclosure of private information from clients. We design an alternating-offers strategy and acceptance criteria to ensure fair agreements without the private information of clients. Simulation results show that the proposed payment allocation strategy can fairly allocate payments to clients while maintaining the accuracy of the global server in FL tasks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13154,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Signal Processing Letters\",\"volume\":\"32 \",\"pages\":\"1500-1504\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-03-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Signal Processing Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10943114/\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Signal Processing Letters","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10943114/","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
Alternating Offer-Based Payment Allocation for Privacy Non-Disclosure in Federated Learning
In federated learning (FL), it is essential to implement a payment allocation mechanism that compensates clients for the costs incurred from participating in FL tasks. In this letter, we formulate the payment allocation as a bargaining game between a global server and clients and adopt the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to achieve optimal and fair payment assignments among clients. Unlike existing payment allocation mechanisms that require the disclosure of private information from the clients, the proposed approach ensures privacy non-disclosure for bargaining. The key idea is to decompose the one-to-many bargaining game into independent one-to-one bargaining games and use alternating-offers, which do not require the disclosure of private information from clients. We design an alternating-offers strategy and acceptance criteria to ensure fair agreements without the private information of clients. Simulation results show that the proposed payment allocation strategy can fairly allocate payments to clients while maintaining the accuracy of the global server in FL tasks.
期刊介绍:
The IEEE Signal Processing Letters is a monthly, archival publication designed to provide rapid dissemination of original, cutting-edge ideas and timely, significant contributions in signal, image, speech, language and audio processing. Papers published in the Letters can be presented within one year of their appearance in signal processing conferences such as ICASSP, GlobalSIP and ICIP, and also in several workshop organized by the Signal Processing Society.