Carrot or stick? How to effectively manage non-scale farming waste in rural areas

Subsidies (carrot) and supervision (stick) are effective ways to enhance the operational stability and efficiency of the centralized third-party governance model for non-scale farming waste in rural areas. However, the specific scenarios in which these methods are applicable still require further exploration, particularly when considering factors such as regional ecological carrying capacity, farming scale, and variations in the geographical distribution of farmers. From that specific perspective, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to reflect the interaction relationships among farmers, third-party enterprises, and the government. Based on this model, this paper first investigates the influencing factors and evolutionary paths of strategy selection by the three parties. Second, by combining the model with the simulation analysis results, the authors explain the stability conditions of the equilibrium solutions for each party's strategy. Finally, according to the natural resource endowment and actual agricultural production situations in different regions, this paper provides applicable scenarios for different regulatory strategies and subsidy schemes. The results of this paper indicate that: ① in regions characterized by a low concentration of farming, small farming scale, and high costs of government involvement in supervision, the government should give acquisition subsidies to farmers and investment subsidies for the third-party enterprise, so as to attract various entities to participate in waste management. ② In regions characterized by high farming concentration, large farming scale, and low costs of government involvement in supervision, the government should adopt a combination of supervision and subsidies, so as to promote the stable operation of the third-party management model. ③ In terms of encouraging farmers to comply with waste disposal regulations, the two strategies of subsidy and supervision (i.e., carrot and stick) have a certain degree of substitution. The government should choose supervision or subsidy strategies according to regional factors, such as the concentration of farming, the ecological carrying capacity, and transportation costs. ④ In all scenarios, the total cost of subsidies and supervision for government participation in third-party centralized waste treatment is lower than the environmental losses and political performance losses caused by unregulated waste discharge. The results of this paper provide theoretical support for government participation in environmental governance, while also providing an investment reference for enterprises.