ceo们会因为运气而得到回报吗？来自企业税收意外之财的证据

IF 7.6 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13448

MARTINA ANDREANI, ATIF ELLAHIE, LAKSHMANAN SHIVAKUMAR

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引用次数: 0

摘要

关注与2017年减税和就业法案相关的一次性税收收益和损失（即意外之财），我们重新审视首席执行官是否因运气而获得奖励。我们发现，监督不力的ceo获得了暴利税的补偿，但没有因相应的税收损失而受到惩罚。在面临更严格薪酬审查的首席执行官中，没有观察到这种模式。意外之财的报酬不能解释为对首席执行官的努力、才能、政治活动的奖励，也不能解释为公司与所有高管分享税收收益。这一结果更符合那些面临薄弱薪酬审查的ceo榨取租金的情况。

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Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? Evidence from Corporate Tax Windfalls

Focusing on the one-off tax gains and losses (i.e., windfalls) associated with the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, we reexamine whether CEOs are rewarded for luck. We find that weakly monitored CEOs are compensated for the windfall tax gains but not penalized for the corresponding tax losses. No such pattern is observed for CEOs facing greater pay scrutiny. The pay for windfalls cannot be explained as rewards for CEOs’ efforts, talents, political activities, or as firms sharing their tax gains with all executives. The results are more consistent with rent extraction by CEOs facing weak pay scrutiny.

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来源期刊

Journal of Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

12.90

自引率

2.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.