残疾保险工作激励机制的变化会影响受益人就业吗?来自促进机会示范的证据

IF 4.8 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Michael Levere , David Wittenburg , John T. Jones
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了残疾受益人的工作行为如何对规则变化做出反应,规则变化取代了现金悬崖(超过该阈值,福利将减少到零),取而代之的是福利抵消斜坡(福利将逐步取消)。通过对1万多名自愿参加示范的社会保障残疾保险受益人进行随机对照试验,我们发现了对收入、收入和福利金额的精确估计的零效应。对机制的分析表明,行政负担、奖励规模有限以及残疾人就业的个人和系统障碍可能是影响有限的原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Can changes in disability insurance work incentives influence beneficiary employment? Evidence from the promoting opportunity demonstration
We study how disability beneficiary work behavior responds to a rule change that replaces a cash cliff—a threshold above which benefits reduce to zero—with a benefit offset ramp—where benefits are gradually phased out. Using a randomized controlled trial with over 10,000 Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries who voluntarily enrolled in the demonstration, we find precisely estimated null effects on earnings, income, and benefit amounts. An analysis of mechanisms indicates that administrative burden, the limited size of the incentive, and individual and systemic barriers to employment for people with disabilities likely contributed to the limited impacts.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.10
自引率
2.00%
发文量
139
审稿时长
70 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Public Economics aims to promote original scientific research in the field of public economics, focusing on the utilization of contemporary economic theory and quantitative analysis methodologies. It serves as a platform for the international scholarly community to engage in discussions on public policy matters.
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