首席执行官内债与内幕交易

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Eric R. Brisker, Dominique Outlaw, Aimee Hoffmann Smith
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了内幕交易,以检验关于内部人如何看待首席执行官养老金和递延报酬(内部债务)的现有理论。管理者报酬理论认为,债务型报酬是最优契约的重要组成部分,因为它降低了股东-债务人的代理成本,这表明股东可能会对首席执行官内部债务的增加做出积极反应。与这一猜想相一致,我们记录了首席执行官内部债务与消息灵通的内部人士净购买量之间的正相关关系。我们使用 2SLS 工具变量估计法缓解了内生性问题。在关注机会主义交易、董事和高管交易以及陷入财务困境的公司时,我们得到了更有力的结果,进一步支持了理论预测。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

CEO Inside Debt and Insider Trading

CEO Inside Debt and Insider Trading

We examine insider trading to test existing theory about how insiders perceive CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt). Managerial compensation theory posits that debt-type compensation is an important component of optimal contracting because it reduces shareholder–debtholder agency costs, suggesting that shareholders may react positively to increases in CEO inside debt. Consistent with this conjecture, we document a positive association between CEO inside debt and net purchasing by well-informed insiders. We alleviate endogeneity concerns using 2SLS instrumental variables estimation. Further supporting theoretical predictions, we obtain stronger results when focusing on opportunistic trades, directors’ and officers’ trades, and financially distressed firms.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
69
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