How to promote public participation in the recycling of floating debris in the reservoir area of hydropower projects? A stochastic quadripartite evolutionary game analysis

The accumulation of floating debris in the reservoir areas of hydropower projects has severely impacted both the ecological environment and shipping safety. During the current floating debris collection, information asymmetry among different governance entities has rendered the floating debris recovery mechanism less effective. However, the public supervision mechanism can be a practical way to reduce this information gap. Therefore, this paper builds a four - party stochastic evolutionary game model involving local government, dam operator, clearing enterprises, and the public to explore an effective public - participation approach. The research findings are as follows: Political participation can stimulate the public's willingness to supervise floating debris recovery in the short term, and continuously strengthening environmental protection awareness can promote the transformation of the public to daily participation. Local government and dam operator hold the "levers" of incentives. By precisely and appropriately increasing the recognition and rewards for public supervision, the public can be encouraged to participate actively. Conversely, it will lead to the sluggish operation of the system. Public participation not only helps with supervision, but also enhances the resilience of the recycling system. However, it is necessary to reasonably control the costs of rewards and supervision to avoid undermining the stability of the system. Local government, by safeguarding the rights and interests of the public and shaping a favorable reputation ecosystem, can not only exert reverse pressure on recycling enterprises to make them act in a standardized way, but also stimulate the internal motivation of the public.