强制性披露和机会主义:来自回购的证据

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS
Brian Bratten, Meng Huang, Nicole Thorne Jenkins, Hong Xie
{"title":"强制性披露和机会主义:来自回购的证据","authors":"Brian Bratten, Meng Huang, Nicole Thorne Jenkins, Hong Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of disclosure requirements on managers' stock repurchase decisions. In 2003, the SEC amended Rule 10b-18, significantly increasing the disclosure requirements for and transparency of stock repurchases for all issuers. While stock repurchases are often used by firms to efficiently return capital to shareholders, they can also be used opportunistically to increase earnings per share. We find that the 2003 SEC amendment enables investors to detect and discount opportunistic repurchases, curtails the extent to which firms use opportunistic repurchases, and reduces or eliminates the negative real effects stemming from opportunistic repurchases (reduced employment, reduced capital expenditures, and reduced R&D expenditures). Our evidence suggests that disclosures aimed at increasing the transparency of firms’ activities can significantly reduce the extent to which firms use these activities opportunistically to manage earnings, thereby reducing the accompanying real consequences of opportunistic behavior.","PeriodicalId":42721,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mandatory disclosures and opportunism: Evidence from repurchases\",\"authors\":\"Brian Bratten, Meng Huang, Nicole Thorne Jenkins, Hong Xie\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We examine the effect of disclosure requirements on managers' stock repurchase decisions. In 2003, the SEC amended Rule 10b-18, significantly increasing the disclosure requirements for and transparency of stock repurchases for all issuers. While stock repurchases are often used by firms to efficiently return capital to shareholders, they can also be used opportunistically to increase earnings per share. We find that the 2003 SEC amendment enables investors to detect and discount opportunistic repurchases, curtails the extent to which firms use opportunistic repurchases, and reduces or eliminates the negative real effects stemming from opportunistic repurchases (reduced employment, reduced capital expenditures, and reduced R&D expenditures). Our evidence suggests that disclosures aimed at increasing the transparency of firms’ activities can significantly reduce the extent to which firms use these activities opportunistically to manage earnings, thereby reducing the accompanying real consequences of opportunistic behavior.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42721,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-03-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Economics Management and Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101783","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究披露要求对经理人股票回购决策的影响。2003年,美国证券交易委员会修订了10b-18规则,大大提高了所有发行人股票回购的披露要求和透明度。虽然股票回购经常被公司用来有效地将资本返还给股东,但它们也可以被投机地用来增加每股收益。我们发现,2003年美国证券交易委员会修正案使投资者能够发现和贴现机会性回购,限制了公司使用机会性回购的程度,并减少或消除了机会性回购带来的负面实际影响(减少就业、减少资本支出和减少研发支出)。我们的证据表明,旨在提高公司活动透明度的披露可以显著降低公司利用这些活动投机地管理收益的程度,从而减少投机行为带来的实际后果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mandatory disclosures and opportunism: Evidence from repurchases
We examine the effect of disclosure requirements on managers' stock repurchase decisions. In 2003, the SEC amended Rule 10b-18, significantly increasing the disclosure requirements for and transparency of stock repurchases for all issuers. While stock repurchases are often used by firms to efficiently return capital to shareholders, they can also be used opportunistically to increase earnings per share. We find that the 2003 SEC amendment enables investors to detect and discount opportunistic repurchases, curtails the extent to which firms use opportunistic repurchases, and reduces or eliminates the negative real effects stemming from opportunistic repurchases (reduced employment, reduced capital expenditures, and reduced R&D expenditures). Our evidence suggests that disclosures aimed at increasing the transparency of firms’ activities can significantly reduce the extent to which firms use these activities opportunistically to manage earnings, thereby reducing the accompanying real consequences of opportunistic behavior.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信