Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-22 DOI:10.1007/s11017-025-09706-5
Nicholas Colgrove
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摘要

在多布斯诉杰克逊案中,最高法院认定,"《宪法》并未赋予堕胎权。'相反,各州必须决定是否存在堕胎权。在多布斯案之后,各州的堕胎法有了很大的不同。这使得人们对法律允许堕胎的范围产生了混淆。因此,据报道,一些孕妇在出现危及生命的情况时没有得到及时治疗。因此,明确的堕胎政策指导至关重要,因为持续的混乱会危及生命。然而,全面呼吁改善患者获得堕胎的机会并不能提供明确的指导,因为不同司法管辖区对 "堕胎 "的定义是不同的。事实上,在定义 "堕胎 "时需要考虑六个变量:(1)"怀孕 "的定义;(2)开具堕胎药是否算堕胎;(3)堕胎是否成功终止妊娠;(4)堕胎是否具有某种特定意图;(5)医疗服务提供者是否必须知道他们可能会伤害胎儿;以及(6)医疗服务提供者是否必须知道他们的病人怀孕了。各国对每个变量的处理方式不同,因此 "堕胎 "在不同司法管辖区的含义也不同。有人可能会回答说,这里的混乱完全归咎于立法者,因为相比之下,医学专家对'堕胎'有着明确的定义。事实并非如此。医学文献中对 "堕胎 "的定义也不一致。因此,对 "堕胎 "的认真讨论将使法律和医学领域受益匪浅。关注这里确定的六个变量是一个很好的起点。在这篇文章中,我将建议如何更好地思考每一个变量,并提出 "堕胎 "的定义,该定义非常适合在一个两极分化的社会中制定明确的堕胎政策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Defining 'Abortion': a call for clarity.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, the Supreme Court found that 'the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion.' Rather, individual states must determine whether a right to abortion exists. Following Dobbs, state abortion laws have diverged significantly. This has generated confusion over what the law permits. Consequently, some pregnant women reportedly have not received timely treatment for life-threatening conditions. Clear guidance on abortion policy is essential, therefore, since continued confusion risks lives. Sweeping calls to improve patient access to abortion will not provide clear guidance, however, since 'abortion' is defined differently across jurisdictions. In fact, there are six variables to consider when defining 'abortion': (1) the definition of 'pregnancy,' (2) whether prescribing abortifacients counts as an abortion, (3) whether abortion successfully terminates pregnancy, (4) whether abortion has some characteristic intention, (5) whether providers must know that they likely will harm fetuses, and (6) whether providers must know that their patients are pregnant. States address each variable differently, so 'abortion' means different things across jurisdictions. One may respond that legislators are solely to blame for confusion here, since medical experts, by contrast, possesses a clear definition of 'abortion.' Not so. 'Abortion' is defined inconsistently throughout the medical literature too. As such, both legal and medical domains would benefit from careful discussions of 'abortion.' Attending to the six variables identified here is a good starting place. In this essay, I suggest how best to think about each and propose a definition of 'abortion' well-suited for developing clear abortion policy in a polarized society.

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