经纪市场中的串通行为

IF 7.6 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13432

JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD, SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS, RICHARD LOWERY

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引用次数: 0

摘要

美国住宅房地产中介市场的高额佣金给经济理论带来了难题，因为经纪不是一个集中的行业。我们将中介市场建模为一个游戏，在这个游戏中，代理商为客户发布价格，然后选择与哪些其他代理商合作。我们证明存在一种均衡，在这种均衡中，每个代理条件与其他代理就其发布的价格进行合作。因此，无论代理商的数量多少，价格都可能明显高于竞争水平（对于固定的折扣因素）。因此，经纪市场即使在集中度低、进入容易的情况下也可能保持不具竞争力。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Collusion in Brokered Markets

High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market pose a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to work with. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each agent conditions working with other agents on those agents' posted prices. Prices can therefore be meaningfully higher than the competitive level (for a fixed discount factor), regardless of the number of agents. Thus, brokered markets can remain uncompetitive even with low concentration and easy entry.

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来源期刊

Journal of Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

12.90

自引率

2.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.