CEO的行动主义和投资者的决策

IF 3.2 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Michael T. Durney, Joseph A. Johnson, Roshan K. Sinha, Donald Young
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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多CEO通过公开表达他们对社会、环境和政治问题的看法来参与行动主义,而其他CEO则不这样做——我们将这种行为称为CEO不行动主义。我们使用两个实验来检验CEO行动主义是如何影响投资者决策的。我们的结果与我们的理论预测一致。当CEO表达与投资者观点一致或不一致的激进立场时,投资者会更多地投资于CEO的公司,因为他们对CEO的看法更积极。我们还发现,当CEO表达与投资者观点一致的立场时,CEO不行动主义可以导致有利的投资决策;我们的过程证据表明,这可能是因为CEO不行动主义增加了投资者相信CEO在社会问题上与他们持相同立场的可能性。最后,我们没有发现证据表明投资者的决策受到CEO (in)行动主义是否响应外部提示的影响。本研究通过提供关于CEO行动主义如何影响投资者的证据,为CEO行动主义这一独特的自愿披露形式的新兴文献做出了贡献。我们还为研究社交媒体披露对投资者决策影响的文献做出了贡献。最后,我们的研究结果对ceo们具有实际意义,因为他们越来越多地面临着参与行动主义的外部压力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

CEO (in)activism and investor decisions

CEO (in)activism and investor decisions

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.
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