消灭外来牲畜疾病的最佳监测和补偿政策

IF 3.4 2区 经济学 Q1 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY
Cristina Salvioni, Paolo Vitale
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了一个理论模型,该模型确定了根除外来家畜疾病的监测和干预之间的最佳资源分配。我们运用博弈论的方法来分析动物卫生管理局(AHA)和畜牧业者之间的战略互动。该模型阐明了育种者的回报如何取决于AHA的选择,反之亦然。我们首先对不确定条件下的养殖户报告决策(被动监控)进行建模。然后,我们分析了美国家禽协会应该如何有效地在主动监测(检查)和干预之间分配资源,并确定这种权衡如何受到各种经济因素的影响,如经营规模和饲养者的风险态度。通过明确考虑被动监督和主动监督之间的关系,该模型调和了研究赔偿支付和报告之间关系的文献与研究监督和干预之间关系的文献。我们以意大利的群居蜂群中的一种寄生虫——小蜂房甲虫为例进行研究,它不存在道德风险问题,因此限制了分析的复杂性。然而,该模型可以适用于其他类型的外来疾病和牲畜。该模型没有提供最优赔偿额和监测概率的精确定量规定。相反,它有助于理解影响最佳监测和干预策略的经济因素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal Surveillance and Indemnity Policy for Eradicating Exotic Livestock Diseases
We present a theoretical model that identifies the optimal resource allocation between surveillance and intervention for eradicating exotic livestock diseases. We apply a game theory approach to analyse the strategic interaction between the Animal Health Authority (AHA) and the stockbreeders. The model elucidates how the breeders' pay‐offs depend upon the AHA's choices and vice versa. We first model the stockbreeder reporting decision (passive surveillance) under uncertainty. Then, we analyse how the AHA should efficiently allocate resources between active surveillance (inspections) and intervention, and determine how this trade‐off is influenced by various economic factors, such as the operation size and breeders' risk attitudes. By explicitly considering the relationship between passive and active surveillance, the model reconciles the literature investigating the nexus between compensation payments and reporting with the literature on the relationship between surveillance and intervention. We use the case study of a parasite of social bee colonies, the Small Hive Beetle, in Italy, which presents no moral hazard concerns, and hence limits the complexity of the analysis. However, the model can be adapted to other types of exotic diseases and livestock. The model does not provide precise quantitative prescriptions of the optimal values to be assigned to indemnities and probability of monitoring. Rather, it contributes to the understanding of the economic factors that influence optimal surveillance and intervention strategies.
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来源期刊
Journal of Agricultural Economics
Journal of Agricultural Economics 管理科学-农业经济与政策
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
2.90%
发文量
48
审稿时长
>24 weeks
期刊介绍: Published on behalf of the Agricultural Economics Society, the Journal of Agricultural Economics is a leading international professional journal, providing a forum for research into agricultural economics and related disciplines such as statistics, marketing, business management, politics, history and sociology, and their application to issues in the agricultural, food, and related industries; rural communities, and the environment. Each issue of the JAE contains articles, notes and book reviews as well as information relating to the Agricultural Economics Society. Published 3 times a year, it is received by members and institutional subscribers in 69 countries. With contributions from leading international scholars, the JAE is a leading citation for agricultural economics and policy. Published articles either deal with new developments in research and methods of analysis, or apply existing methods and techniques to new problems and situations which are of general interest to the Journal’s international readership.
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