低碳服务供应链如何实现合作减排:一个进化博弈论研究

IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Yingying Xu, Jinshi Wang, Ao Cheng, Lijing Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在由碳依赖型制造商和低碳服务公司组成的低碳服务供应链中,收益共享和保证碳减排的双重契约促进了可持续合作和减排。然而,当消极合作行为发生或合作僵局出现时,调整合同条款和合作关系仍未得到充分探讨。因此,我们构建了一个演化博弈模型来分析碳依赖型制造商与低碳服务企业之间的合作行为。通过稳定性分析,确定了主动承诺的条件。重要的是,潜在的消极策略可能会阻碍最优合作减排,导致合作僵局。数值模拟结果表明:(1)较高的碳减排保证目标或适度的清算保证金可以防止负面行为的发生。(2)改变碳交易收入或政府补贴的分配比例有助于产业链走向合作。(3)服务创新促进积极合作;然而,低碳服务企业必须具备将其服务创新水平转化为碳减排绩效的能力。此外,功利性服务创新和探索性服务创新影响合作决策的机制也存在差异。(4)当供应链成员陷入决策僵局时,除了适度增加碳减排保额或对未达到碳减排目标的处罚外,提高碳依赖型制造商的碳交易收入分配比例、增加政府补贴分配、实施服务创新等也有助于打破僵局。(5)与单一碳交易政策相比,碳交易政策与政府补贴相结合能有效促进可持续发展。研究结果对低碳服务供应链合作减排和政策制定具有重要影响。本文的研究结论对低碳服务供应链运行中成员间合作减排关系的维护和政策制定具有启示意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How to Achieve Cooperative Emission Reduction in Low-Carbon Service Supply Chains: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Study

In a low-carbon service supply chain, consisting of a carbon-dependent manufacturer and a low-carbon service company, a dual contract for revenue sharing and guaranteed carbon reduction promotes sustainable collaboration and emission reduction. However, adjusting contract terms and collaborative relationships when negative cooperative behavior occurs or a collaboration impasse arises remains underexplored. Thus, we constructed an evolutionary game model to analyze cooperative behaviors between carbon-dependent manufacturers and low-carbon service companies. Through stability analysis, we identify conditions for active commitment. Importantly, potential negative strategies may hinder optimal cooperative emission reduction, leading to a cooperative deadlock. Numerical simulations reveal the following: (1) Higher guaranteed carbon reduction targets or moderate liquidated deposit can prevent negative behaviors. (2) Changing the allocation ratio of carbon trading revenue or government subsidies helps the chain move towards cooperation. (3) Service innovation facilitates positive cooperation; however, low-carbon service companies must possess the capability to translate their level of service innovation into carbon reduction performance. Furthermore, the mechanisms through which utilitarian and exploratory service innovations influence cooperative decision-making differ. (4) When supply chain members find themselves in a decision-making impasse, in addition to moderately increasing the carbon reduction guarantee amount or the penalties for failing to meet carbon reduction targets, enhancing the distribution ratio of carbon trading revenues for carbon-dependent manufacturers, increasing the allocation of government subsidies, and implementing service innovations can also help break the deadlock. (5) Combined carbon trading policies and government subsidies effectively promote sustainability compared to singular adoption. These findings impact cooperative emission reduction in low-carbon service supply chains and policy formulation. The conclusions of this paper have implications for the maintenance of cooperative emission reduction relationships among members in the operation of low-carbon service supply chains and the formulation of policies.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
18.20%
发文量
242
期刊介绍: Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.
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