防止管理层过度自信而囤积坏消息:来自《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》的证据

IF 5.5 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Hyeong Joon Kim , Seongjae Mun
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究考察了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(SOX)对管理层过度自信与股价崩盘风险之间关系的影响。文献认为,过于自信的首席执行官比其他人更有可能囤积坏消息,从而导致更高的崩溃风险。我们的研究结果表明,SOX抑制了管理层过度自信的坏消息囤积。结果表明,ceo过度自信与ceo非过度自信的企业的崩溃风险差异在SOX法案出台前显著,但在SOX法案出台后几乎消失。我们使用财务重述和分析师的预测,提供支持性证据,证明SOX通过坏消息囤积渠道降低了崩溃风险。我们还发现,对于外部治理机制较弱的公司和财务受限的公司,SOX的有效性更为明显。总的来说,这项研究表明,SOX有助于减轻过度自信的管理行为,如坏消息囤积。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Restraining bad news hoarding from managerial overconfidence: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
This study examines the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the association between managerial overconfidence and stock price crash risk. The literature posits that overconfident CEOs are more likely to hoard bad news than others, leading to a higher crash risk. Our findings indicate that SOX restrains bad news hoarding from managerial overconfidence. As a result, the difference in crash risk between firms with overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs is significant before SOX but almost disappears after SOX. We provide supportive evidence that SOX reduces crash risk through the bad-news-hoarding channel, using financial restatements and analysts' forecasting. We also find that the effectiveness of SOX is more pronounced for firms with weaker external governance mechanisms and those that are financially constrained. Overall, this study suggests that SOX helps mitigate overconfident managerial behavior, such as bad news hoarding.
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来源期刊
Global Finance Journal
Global Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
13.50%
发文量
106
审稿时长
53 days
期刊介绍: Global Finance Journal provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques among academicians and practitioners and, thereby, advances applied research in global financial management. Global Finance Journal publishes original, creative, scholarly research that integrates theory and practice and addresses a readership in both business and academia. Articles reflecting pragmatic research are sought in areas such as financial management, investment, banking and financial services, accounting, and taxation. Global Finance Journal welcomes contributions from scholars in both the business and academic community and encourages collaborative research from this broad base worldwide.
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