无战略约束和预算平衡的装配机制

IF 0.8 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2025.107256

Soumendu Sarkar

引用次数: 0

摘要

装配问题涉及一个买方和多个卖方之间的交换。买方可能想购买多个项目和卖方各自拥有一个项目。当代理人有私人估值时，我们描述了一类策略证明，个体理性和预算平衡的机制。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms for assembly

Assembly problems involve exchange among a buyer and multiple sellers. The buyer wants to purchase possibly multiple items and sellers own one item each. We characterize the class of strategyproof, individually rational and budget balanced mechanisms for this problem when agents have private valuations.

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.