漫长的等待会使人堕落,尤其是在意想不到的情况下

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Linda Dezső , Gergely Hajdu , Yossef Tobol
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引用次数: 0

摘要

两项研究的结果表明,长时间和意想不到的等待会对道德行为产生不利影响。在研究1中,刚刚在本古里安机场排队办理登机手续的乘客猜测他们需要等待多长时间才能办理登机手续,然后记录他们的实际等待时间。登记后,他们私下掷骰子,报告结果,同时知道越高的报告收益越高。我们发现等待时间与说谎呈正相关。研究2(实验室实验)将等待的持续时间(长与短)外源性化,以及这些持续时间是否事先为受试者所知(预期)或未知(意外)。我们发现,平均而言,长时间的等待比短时间的等待导致更多的谎言,而平均谎言在长时间和意想不到的等待中是最高的。我们建议,在漫长而意想不到的等待之后,人们可以通过放松的道德在货币领域寻求补偿。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected
Results of two studies demonstrate that long and unexpected waits adversely shape moral behavior. In Study 1, passengers who had just joined the check-in line at Ben Gurion Airport guessed how long they would have to wait to check in, and then their actual wait duration was recorded. After checking in, they privately rolled a die, reported an outcome while knowing that higher reports yield higher earnings. We found that wait duration is positively associated with lying. Study 2 (laboratory experiment) exogenized the duration of waits (long versus short) and whether those durations were known (expected) or unknown (unexpected) to subjects in advance. We find that long waits cause, on average, more lying than short waits, and that average lying is the highest for long and unexpected waits. We propose that after long and unexpected waits, people may seek compensation in the monetary domain via relaxed morals.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
9.10%
发文量
392
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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