基于令牌的审稿人经济:管理审稿人短缺问题的拟议机构

IF 6.5 2区 管理学 Q1 INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE
Cecil Eng Huang Chua
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了两种基于令牌的系统来修复信息系统学院的审查系统。目前,审查系统消耗的人力资源比信息系统学院多一个数量级。这种溢出的成本完全由信息系统研究人员承担。我认为,这是因为审查系统基于礼物经济,无法应对目前的市场规模。这两项提议都涉及代币和中央管理机构的创建。第一个提议涉及一个围绕审查银行(中央管理机构)建立的市场,该银行发行作为代理货币的审查令牌。期刊是作者和审稿人之间的中介。作者为期刊的评论付费,期刊为评论者和编辑等专家的服务付费。审稿人在公开市场上交换他们的审稿代币,或者与大学等机构交换审稿代币。第二个建议涉及礼品经济,即审稿人将他们的忠诚从同行转移到信息系统学院。在这个提议中,每个单独的令牌都是唯一的,就像一张交易卡,一个关联板跟踪令牌的转移,将令牌的前持有者联系在一起,形成一个审查环。随着代币被转送,它们积累了历史,从而积累了社会价值,以每个持有者写的信息的形式体现出来。以前拥有大量代币和具有特定历史的代币会带来地位上的好处。这些好处反过来将评审人员锁定在评审环系统中,鼓励他们进行进一步的评审。讨论了这两种政策的经济、社会和其他影响,并提出了信息系统学院需要解决的问题。讨论的示例问题包括提案对审稿人政治权力的影响以及信息系统学院政治权力的转移。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Token-based reviewer economies: Proposed institutions for managing the reviewer shortage problem

Token-based reviewer economies: Proposed institutions for managing the reviewer shortage problem

This opinion paper presents two proposed token-based systems to fix the information system academy's review system. At present, the review system consumes more human resources than the information systems academy has by an order of magnitude. The cost of this overflow is borne entirely by information systems researchers. I argue this is because the review system is based on a gift economy that cannot handle the currently sized market. Both proposals involve the creation of tokens and a central governing body. The first proposal involves a market built around a review bank (central governing body) that issues review tokens that function as a proxy currency. Journals function as intermediaries between authors and reviewers. Authors pay journals for reviews, and journals pay experts such as reviewers and editors for their services. Reviewers exchange their review tokens on the open market or trade review tokens for favours with institutions like universities. The second proposal involves a gift economy where reviewers transfer their allegiance from peers to the information systems academy. In this proposal, each individual token is unique, like a trading card and an affiliation board tracks the transfer of tokens, linking former possessors of a token together in a review ring. As tokens are regifted, they accumulate history, and thereby social worth, captured in the form of messages each possessor writes. Former possession of a large number of tokens and of tokens with particular histories confers status benefits. These benefits in turn lock reviewers into the review ring system encouraging them to do further reviews. Economic, social, and other implications of both policies are discussed and questions are posed for the information systems academy to grapple with. Example issues discussed include the effect of the proposals on the political power of reviewers and shifts in political power in the information systems academy.

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来源期刊
Information Systems Journal
Information Systems Journal INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE-
CiteScore
14.60
自引率
7.80%
发文量
44
期刊介绍: The Information Systems Journal (ISJ) is an international journal promoting the study of, and interest in, information systems. Articles are welcome on research, practice, experience, current issues and debates. The ISJ encourages submissions that reflect the wide and interdisciplinary nature of the subject and articles that integrate technological disciplines with social, contextual and management issues, based on research using appropriate research methods.The ISJ has particularly built its reputation by publishing qualitative research and it continues to welcome such papers. Quantitative research papers are also welcome but they need to emphasise the context of the research and the theoretical and practical implications of their findings.The ISJ does not publish purely technical papers.
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